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INTRODUCTION

C

ommercial actors have long been allowed to exercise a
significant amount of autonomy over the substantive law
that governs their legal controversies.1 Not only can parties
choose to have the law of a particular state apply to their dis* Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge; D.Phil., University of Oxford; J.D.,
Duke University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University
of California, Davis. The author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in
New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in England and Wales, is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and Senior Fellow at the
Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution. The author would like to thank
the participants at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium, “What Law Governs International Commercial Contracts? Divergent Doctrine and the New
Hague Principles,” for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. All
errors of course remain the author’s own.
1. See LAWRENCE COLLINS ET AL., DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS ¶¶ 32-004, 32-044, 32R-061 (14th ed. 2006). Party autonomy regarding substantive choice of law appears to be higher in North America and Europe than in Latin America. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague
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pute,2 they can also in a growing number of cases choose to
adopt one of several forms of non-state law3 ranging from the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(“UNIDROIT”) Principles of International Commercial Contracts4 to the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Convention on the International
Sale of Goods (“CISG”)5 to the lex mercatoria.6
Parties’ procedural options are much more limited.7 Although
international commercial actors can exercise a limited amount
of discretion by deciding to take their disputes to arbitration or
Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts: Some Preliminary
Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873, 875–76 (2013).
2. The law does not necessarily need to have a connection to one of the
parties or the dispute. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 169 (4th ed. 2013)
[hereinafter BORN, DRAFTING].
3. The ability to choose the substantive law that governs a dispute is
somewhat wider in arbitration than in litigation, although that phenomenon
may be changing. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 2243–44 (2009) [hereinafter BORN, ICA]; see also Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Draft Commentary on
the Draft Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts 14–
17 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/princ_com.pdf;
Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Choice
of Law in International Contracts: Draft Hague Principles and Future Planning,
Annex
I,
art.
2
(Feb.
2013),
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2013pd06en.pdf
[hereinafter
Draft
Hague Principles].
4. See UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commerical Contracts,
http://www.unidroit.org/news (select “Instruments”; then select “Commerical
Contracts”; then follow links to access the various versions from 1994, 2004,
and 2010) (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
5. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
6. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 2232–37. The term lex mercatoria is
typically used to refer to various uncodified principles of international commercial law, although there is a wide-ranging debate about the content,
scope, and existence of lex mercatoria. See KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE
CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA (2d ed. 2010); MATTI S.
KURKELA & SANTTU TURUNEN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 6–7 (2d ed. 2010) (suggesting the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts constitute a codified version of the lex mercatoria); Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International
Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 657, 665 (1999).
7. See David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure? 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 389, 392–95, 402–25 (2014).
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to a particular forum,8 once a matter is in litigation, the case is
typically heard pursuant to the procedural norms of the forum
court.9
For many years, this practice was explained in terms of “a
‘State sovereignty prerogative’” that was rooted in the fact that
“judicial power is one of the three main . . . branches” of government.10 However, the procedural hegemony of the state has
arguably begun to break down,11 and some commentators have
suggested that it may now be possible to view judicial procedures as “sticky default” rules12 rather than as immutable and
“non-negotiable parameters.”13
Although many domestic litigants would likely welcome an
increased ability to choose the procedural law that governs
their disputes, the desire for procedural autonomy may be
heightened in international matters, since discrepancies in national practice can make it difficult for parties not only to pursue their claims14 but also to have confidence in the legitimacy
8. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 4–14.
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971); COLLINS
ET AL., supra note 1, ¶¶ 7-002, 32-054, 32-060; Erin A. O’Hara O’Connor &
Christopher R. Drahozal, Carve-Outs and Contractual Procedure (Vanderbilt
Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 13-29, Law &
Econ.
Working
Paper
No.
13-16,
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2279520 (noting little
actual individualization).
10. Jorge A. Sánchez-Cordero Dávila, Preface to AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
(ALI) & UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE xxix,
xxxiii (2006) (citation omitted); see also Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 780, 859 (2012) [hereinafter
Born, Adjudication] (discussing the longstanding presumption that parties
appearing in national court are subject to a single, uniform set of mandatory
procedures established by the state).
11. Commentary is split on this point, and empirical research focuses primarily on the domestic realm. See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 517 (2011); Hoffman, supra note 7, at 392–93, 394–95, 403, 425; O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 9
(considering some international matters); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 667–68 (2005).
12. Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1155, 1165 (2013).
13. Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil
Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 462 (2007).
14. Transnational litigation gives rise to a number of procedural problems
not seen in domestic suits, including unusual difficulties relating to jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transna-
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of the proceedings themselves.15 Furthermore, one party will
often have a significant “home court” advantage in national litigation16 unless the action has been brought in a neutral (unaffiliated) jurisdiction.17
Concerns about procedural diversity in international disputes
have typically led to calls for procedural harmonization.18 Pertional Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251, 272–93 (2006); Richard A.
Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19–41 (2009); S.I. Strong, Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Strong, Judgments].
15. For example, civil law lawyers typically regard U.S.-style discovery
with “horror,” while U.S. lawyers find the absence of discovery to be akin to a
denial of justice. See Javier H. Rubinstein, International Commercial Arbitration: Reflections at the Crossroads of the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 304 (2004); see also Jalal El Ahdab & Amal
Bouchenaki, Discovery in International Arbitration: A Foreign Creature for
Civil Lawyers?, in ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN CHANGING TIMES, XV ICCA
CONG. SER. (2010 Rio) 65, 73 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2011); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1694
(1998) [hereinafter Hazard, Secrets].
16. Not only will one party typically be more familiar with the procedures
used in the forum court, it will also have structured its business dealings so
as to comply with the underlying expectations of that national legal system.
This phenomenon is perhaps most apparent in terms of evidentiary privileges. A U.S. corporation will likely structure its internal communications so as
to take full advantage of U.S. principles concerning the attorney-client and
work product privilege. Other countries do not protect legal communications
in the same manner, which means that a foreign company’s internal documents may be discoverable simply because that company was not in the habit
of framing its communications to comply with U.S. law. See JEFF WAINCYMER,
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 800–15 (2012);
Klaus Peter Berger, Evidentiary Privileges: Best Practice Standards Versus/and Arbitral Discretion, 22 ARB. INT’L 501, 517–18 (2006) [hereinafter
Berger, Privileges]. Though courts make some efforts to address these issues,
such initiatives are often unsatisfactory. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1971); WAINCYMER, supra, at 805.
17. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 3. However, not every legal system is willing to accept jurisdiction over every dispute involving foreign parties. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (concerning
“foreign-cubed” actions).
18. See Simona Grossi, Rethinking the Harmonization of Jurisdictional
Rules, 86 TUL. L. REV. 623, 625 (2012); Burkhard Hess, Procedural Harmonisation in a European Context, in CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALISING WORLD
159 (X.E. Kramer & C.H. van Rhee eds., 2012); Thomas O. Main, Book Review, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 467, 467 (2013) [hereinafter Main, Review] (reviewing CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALISING WORLD, supra); Richard Marcus, Bomb
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haps the most notable initiative in this regard involves the
American Law Institute (“ALI”) and UNIDROIT Principles of
Transnational Civil Procedure, which attempt “to overcome
fundamental differences between common-law and civil-law
systems and, among common-law systems, to cope with the peculiarities of the U.S. system.”19 However, the sometimes significant disparities in national procedures and the vehemence
with which such practices are defended have acted as significant obstacles to harmonization.20
As a result, some reformers have shifted their focus from
harmonization to privatization.21 Some success has been
Throwing, Democratic Theory, and Basic Values—A New Path to Procedural
Harmonization?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 475, 486 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus,
Bomb].
19. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Reporters’ Preface to ALI & UNIDROIT,
supra note 10, xxvii, xxvii; see also E. Bruce Leonard, Preface to ALI &
UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at xxix, xxx. However, even the ALI and
UNIDROIT take the view that “[t]he procedural law of the forum applies in
matters not addressed in these Principles.” See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra
note 10, at 16.
20. See RICHARD GARNETT, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 67–70 (2012) (noting limited successes); Marcus, Bomb,
supra note 18, at 477; Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 836 (2010) [hereinafter Main, Substantive] (noting that many states “may be more likely to consider abandoning their own substantive regimes of commercial law . . . than they would
surrender their own procedure”). Thus, the ALI/UNDROIT Principles of
Transnational Civil Procedure have not yet been adopted by any national
legal system. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at xxix, xxxviii–xxxix
(noting effect of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles in Mexico); OSCAR G. CHASE ET
AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 574–75 (Oscar G. Chase &
Helen Hershkoff eds., 2007); Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil
Procedure Trends in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
1, 23 (2011). However, the European Law Institute (ELI) has recently announced its intention to adapt the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure for use in the European Union. See ALI & UNIDROIT,
supra note 10; European Law Institute, Meeting of ELI Representative and
Secretary-General of UNIDROIT, http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/newsevents/news-contd/article/discussions-underway-for-eliunidroit-jointconference-inautumn/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=132848&cHash=dde59166ad7d6019d1594
7f19e5e7327 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
21. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 3; H. Patrick Glenn, Prospects
for Transnational Civil Procedure in the Americas, 8 REVUE DE DROIT
UNIFORME [UNIFORM L. REV.] 485, 489–90 (2003). Procedural privatization
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achieved in this regard, most notably in the form of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (“COCA”), which increases the ability of private commercial parties to choose the
forum that will be used to resolve their disputes.22 Because
choice of forum has traditionally dictated choice of procedure,23
parties can use forum selection provisions as a means of exercising a limited amount of procedural autonomy. However, as
useful as COCA may be, it still does not permit parties to adopt
individual procedures a la carte.24
For years, this holistic approach to procedure was unquestioned. However, a number of recent developments have suggested a possible shift in thinking about procedural autonomy.25 For example, “some distinguished scholars now argue
that parties’ greater ability to contract out of federal and state
procedure [through arbitration agreements] entails the lesser
power to modify it.”26 Other commentators have suggested that
the high degree of judicial respect for freedom of contract and

relates to autonomous procedural choices by individual parties, as opposed to
procedural harmonization, which takes place at the state level. See SánchezCordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii.
22. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on
Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, reprinted in 44 I.L.M. 1294,
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98
[hereinafter COCA]. Although COCA has been finalized, it has not yet come
into force. See id. Ratification in the United States has been delayed pending
debate about the nature of the implementing legislation. See U.S. Department of State Advisory Committee on Private International Law: Notice of
Public Meeting of the Study Group on the Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements, 77 FED. REG. 72,904 (Nov. 29, 2012); Memorandum of the
Legal Adviser Regarding U.S. Implementation of the Hague Convention on
Choice
of
Courts
Agreements
(Jan.
19,
2013),
available
at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/2013/206657.htm.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (1971)
(stating that “[a] court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how
litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case”); COLLINS ET AL., supra note 1,
¶¶ 7-002, 32-054, 32-060.
24. See COCA, supra note 22.
25. See Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation
by the Norms Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 473 (2013);
see also Glenn, supra note 21, at 490 (“There is thus a disguised or hidden
rule of party autonomy within domestic procedural law.”).
26. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 391.
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procedural waivers provides a sufficiently strong foundation for
private procedural contracts.27
However, some boundaries to procedural autonomy must
necessarily exist, either as a matter of prudence, policy, or
practice.28 Indeed, one need look no farther than arbitration to
see that there are limits to what courts will allow in terms of
procedural autonomy, even in jurisdictions that grant broad
respect to arbitration.29
The debate about the propriety of private procedural contracts in the domestic context is extensive and ongoing.30 How27. See Shutte v. Thompson, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 151, 159 (1872) (noting
that “[a] party may waive any provision, either of a contract or of a statute,
intended for his benefit”); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will
Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 595 (2007); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the
Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 433 (1993).
28. For example, transactional costs may make individualized procedures
too expensive to pursue. See O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 9. Alternatively, unbounded procedural autonomy could create situations that are procedurally unfair. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 551 (noting “contract
procedure could produce a court system in which the rules of the game reflect
a set of narrow interests and not the overall welfare”).
29. See Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008)
(striking a provision purporting to expand the grounds of judicial review of an
arbitral award); In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hours Emp’t Practices Litig., 737
F.3d 1262, 1267–68 (9th Cir. 2013) (striking a contractual provision allegedly
waiving the parties’ right to judicial review of an arbitral award); see also
infra notes 262–386 and accompanying text.
30. An impressive body of literature already exists. See Robert G. Bone,
Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX.
L. REV. 1329, 1362–67 (2012); Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 520–64;
Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723,
776–83 (2011); Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and
Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103 (2011); Hoffman, supra note 7, at 426–28;
David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 607–08 (2010); Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon
Klement, Contractualizing Procedure (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1323056; Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective
on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1475–77 (2013) [hereinafter Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex Ante]; David Marcus, The Perils of Contract
Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal
Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 974–75 (2008); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice
of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 293–96 (1988); Paulson, supra note 25,
at 471; Resnik, supra note 11, at 609–22; Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural
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ever, no one appears to have yet considered the special case of
international commercial litigation. This lacuna is somewhat
surprising, since the United States Supreme Court has indicated on numerous occasions that the unique nature of international commerce requires courts to give an increased amount of
respect to existing forms of procedural contracts (i.e., forum selection provisions and arbitration agreements).31
To some extent, the absence of academic interest in crossborder disputes may be explained by the overwhelming popularity of international commercial arbitration.32 If parties can
achieve the desired degree of procedural autonomy in arbitration, then there may be little need to develop similar principles
in litigation.
However, it is by no means clear that international commercial arbitration is going to retain its status as the preferred
means of resolving cross-border business disputes.33 Recent

Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514,
516–17 (2009); Moffitt, supra note 13, at 462; Noyes, supra note 27, at 581;
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856–69 (2006); John W. Strong, Consensual Modifications of the Rules of Evidence: The Limits of Party Autonomy in an Adversary
System, 80 NEB. L. REV. 159, 160–61 (2001) [hereinafter Strong, Consensual];
David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted
Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional
Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1085–86 (2002); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 183 (2006).
31. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 629 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974);
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1972).
32. International commercial arbitration is the preferred means resolving
disputes arising out of international business transactions. See S.I. STRONG,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 6 (2012)
GUIDE],
available
at
[hereinafter
STRONG,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/strongarbit.pdf/$file/strongarbit.pdf.
Procedural autonomy is one of the primary reasons parties arbitrate their
disputes, although arbitration provides a number of other benefits as well.
See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1748; JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶ 21-3 (2003).
33. See WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
DISPUTES: STUDIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 3–27 (2012); Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration—Corporate Attitudes and Practices—12 Perceptions
Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
525, 584 (2004); Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration,”
17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 66–67 (2012); S.I. Strong, Increasing Legalism in
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concerns about arbitration’s rising costs and increased formalities have led many multinational companies to explore other
dispute resolution options.34 One possibility involves so-called
“bespoke” litigation, where parties can customize the procedures used in court so as to lessen or eliminate any “home
court” advantages and avoid any procedural practices that pose
problems for domestic or foreign litigants.35
The interest in customized litigation processes goes beyond
individual commercial parties. A number of institutional and
industry groups have also indicated their support for private
procedural contracts, thereby signaling the possibility that significant change is afoot.36 For example, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”) has recently created an Economical Litigation Agreement (known colloquially as the Model Civil Litigation Prenup)37 that allows parties to individualize their dispute resolution procedures.38
Somewhat similarly, the international construction industry
(often an innovator in dispute resolution procedures) has proposed a process known as “guided choice,” whereby a neutral
third party, similar to a mediator, helps parties create an indi-

International Commercial Arbitration: A New Theory of Causes, A New Approach to Cures, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 117, 117 (2013).
34. See Noyes, supra note 27, at 591. International commercial mediation
has been touted as a promising alternative to arbitration, but there are a
number of potential problems with that proposition. See Nolan-Haley, supra
note 33, at 63–64; S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commercial Arbitration?
The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 42 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y (forthcoming 2014).
35. U.S.-style discovery is one of the most often-mentioned concerns. See
Rubinstein, supra note 15, at 304 (noting foreign litigants react to U.S. discovery “with horror”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Gateways and Pathways in Civil
Procedure, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1652, 1657, 1671 (2013) (noting, with others,
that discovery abuse leads even domestic parties to opt out of litigation).
36. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 389. Institutional support may be critical to
the success of a particular procedural innovation. See id. at 429 (discussing
“public credentialing moments”).
37. See Introduction: Economical Litigation Agreement, INT’L INST. FOR
CONFLICT
PREVENTION
&
RESOLUTION,
http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ADRTools/EconomicalLitigationAgreement.
aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2014) [hereinafter CPR Economical Litigation
Agreement].
38. Id.
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vidualized dispute resolution procedure that is then used to resolve the underlying substantive concerns.39
As useful as these and other initiatives may be, it is unknown
whether and to what extent they will be embraced by U.S. and
other courts.40 Furthermore, at this point there is no clear consensus regarding how these sorts of agreements should be analyzed. For example, some commentators claim that analytical
priority should be given to contract law, while other observers
suggest that procedural law constitutes the proper conceptual
paradigm.41 Finding an appropriate balance between the two
disciplines can be difficult, given the hybrid nature of procedural contracts.42
Another issue that arises in the international realm involves
the variations in how different jurisdictions approach procedural and contract law.43 While detailed consideration of a single nation’s law may be sufficient in the domestic setting, a
broader focus is necessary in cross-border conflicts.
Given these concerns, this Article adopts a new analytical
paradigm that emphasizes structural and substantive issues
rather than more narrow questions of contract or procedural
law. In so doing, the Article overcomes the contract law39. See Paul M. Lurie, Guided Choice: Early Mediated Settlements and/or
Customized Arbitrations, 7 J. AM. C. CONSTR. LAW. 167, 169 (2013).
40. The propriety of a procedural contract may need to be considered from
a variety of national perspectives, including that of the parties, the forum,
and the place where the judgment will be enforced.
41. Compare Hoffman, supra note 7, at 430 (suggesting that “scholars of
privatized procedure should spend more energy on contracts and less on procedure”), with Paulson, supra note 25, at 474 (suggesting that “contract procedure can be usefully evaluated by the norms underlying civil procedure”).
Other commmentators emphasize potential differences that may arise depending on whether the dispute is heard in federal court, state court, or regulatory proceedings. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 597–98; Mark D. Rosen, The
Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005).
42. Of course, the two lines of discussion reflect some overlap. For example, contract-based discussions often focus on the limits of party autonomy in
the face of institutional concerns about judicial administration while procedure-oriented debates typically focus on due process considerations. See
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 401–02; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 551.
43. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Comparative Contract Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 899, 905–34 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2008); Joachim Zekoll, Comparative Civil Procedure, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra, at 1327, 1327–61.
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procedural law dichotomy and provides a more internationally
oriented approach to procedural privatization.
The discussion begins in Part I with a brief discussion of why
parties may have a heightened need or desire for procedural
contracts in international commercial disputes. This section
also considers whether and to what extent parties will actually
begin to adopt private procedural agreements if those agreements are held to be enforceable.
The Article continues in Part II with an introduction to various structural concerns relating to private procedural contracts. Structural issues arise as a result of state interests in
preserving the constitutionally mandated role of public institutions such as the courts.44 Although the concept of “regulation”—which could be said to include questions relating to civil
procedure—appears to be shifting away from a formal command-and-control model to a mixed public-private approach,45
there still may be some elements of litigation that must remain
immune from private contract. This section therefore provides
both a theoretical and a practical evaluation of the structural
limits on party autonomy in litigation and includes both consequentialist and deontological analyses.
Substantive issues are addressed in Part III. Substantive—
meaning content based—concerns are triggered by the “substantial state interest” in preserving the fairness of trial.46 If
individualized procedures are to be allowed, courts must be assured that due process and procedural fairness are properly

44. See Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1435, 1444, 1447 (2013).
45. For example, “[t]here is no consensus in policy or academic circles as to
what exactly is connoted by the term regulation.” Colin Scott, Privatization
and Regulatory Regimes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY, 651,
653 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006). One classic definition states that regulation involves “sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency
over activities that are socially valued,” although modern critics have expanded the scope of application to include regulatory activity undertaken by
private actors and other decentralized entities. Id. (citation omitted). Many of
the changes come as a result of “new governance” theory. See id. at 651 (describing the privatization of regulatory regimes); Peer Zumbansen, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and
International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 197, 201 (2004).
46. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991);
NCALJ Panel Discussion, ALJ Decisions—Final or Fallible?, 25 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 191, 199 (2005).
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respected and protected. Although this subject could be analyzed from a variety of perspectives, this Article attempts to
identify the outer bounds of procedural autonomy in litigation
through comparisons to international commercial arbitration.
This analogy appears appropriate not only because international commercial arbitration addresses precisely those types of
disputes that are at issue in this Article but also because various scholars have linked the expansion of procedural autonomy
in litigation to procedural autonomy in arbitration.47
Part IV takes the analysis one step further by addressing
various logistical concerns facing parties who wish to customize
their litigation procedures. This discussion also analyzes several proposed models for private procedural contracts.
Finally, the Article concludes by tying together the various
strands of analysis and offering a number of observations regarding the future of private procedural contracts in the international commercial realm. Notably, although this Article focuses primarily on international commercial disputes, a number of the analyses and conclusions reflected herein apply
equally to domestic matters.
I. THE NEED (OR DESIRE) FOR PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. Rationales Supporting Procedural Autonomy in International Commercial Relationships
This Article takes as its starting point the notion that there
is something about international commercial disputes that
leads to a heightened need or desire for procedural autonomy.
Although there are a variety of ways of proving this hypothesis,
the most commonly enunciated rationale for party autonomy in
commercial affairs involves concerns about predictability. This
principle can be illustrated by a series of decisions rendered by
the United States Supreme Court in the late twentieth century,
although the need for certainty in cross-border business transactions has been recognized by numerous other authorities.48
47. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1331, 1334; Dodge, supra note 30, at 736;
Hoffman, supra note 7, at 390–91.
48. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 629 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974); M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1, 11, 13–15 (1972)
(noting England enforces forum selection provisions); Premium Nafta Prods.
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The U.S. Supreme Court first considered procedural autonomy in international commercial disputes in 1972, in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen).49 Although the
Court had already upheld the validity of forum selection clauses in the domestic context,50 The Bremen was the first case to
address such provisions in the international realm.51
In its decision, the Supreme Court not only upheld the parties’ agreement despite a historical antipathy to forum selection provisions,52 but the Court also recognized the special status of international forum selection provisions, stating that
[t]he expansion of American business and industry will hardly
be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist
on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts.53

Because “agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both
parties is an indispensable element in international trade,
commerce, and contracting,”54 the Court “eschewed a provincial
solicitude for the jurisdiction of domestic forums” and upheld
the forum selection provision.55
A key element of the Court’s analysis involved the link between autonomy and predictability or, in the Court’s words,
“certainty.”56 According to the Court, procedural autonomy exists so as to increase predictability in transnational com-

Ltd. v. Fili Shipping Co., [2007] UKHL 40, [26] (appeal taken from Eng.),
aff’g Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 20 (Eng.)
(discussing enforcement of forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements); BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 1.
49. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 1; Main, Review, supra note 18, at 475
(citing the desire for procedural certainty as reflected in empirical studies).
50. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964).
51. See id.; see also The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
52. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9–10.
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id. at 13–14, as quoted in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985).
55. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 630 (construing The Bremen, 407
U.S. at 1).
56. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13–14, 17.
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merce.57 However, there are several different types of predictability.
First, predictability can involve issues of substantive law. Interestingly, although The Bremen is often cited as support for
procedural autonomy, the decision also discussed how forum
selection provisions ensure predictability in the substantive
law.58 This link between procedural and substantive law could
be important to the current debate about customized procedural contracts.59
Second, predictability can refer to the place where the dispute will be heard. This is the feature that is most commonly
associated with forum selection clauses and was at the heart of
the decision in The Bremen.60 Choice of court agreements facilitate a certain amount of procedural predictability because the
law of the forum is presumed to control most, if not all, procedural matters.61
Third, predictability can relate to the enforceability of the
judgment arising out of the chosen venue. This issue was not
discussed in The Bremen, since that dispute involved the initial
enforcement of a forum selection provision.62 However, forum
selection clauses have not traditionally provided any assurances regarding the enforcement of a judgment resulting from litigation in the preferred venue.63 Instead, judgments arising out
of a forum selection provision are subject to the same complicated, confusing, and often unpredictable process that applies
to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in other contexts.64 This feature is relevant to the debate about pro57. See id. at 17.
58. See id. at 13 n.15 (noting that “[i]t is . . . reasonable to conclude that
the forum clause was also an effort to obtain certainty as to the applicable
substantive law”).
59. See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.
60. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13–14.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971); COLLINS
ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 7-002. However, this rule is not always as clear cut as
it seems. See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.
62. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
63. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 19, 151–52.
64. The problem is linked to the absence of any multinational treaty concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. See id. at 19,
151–52; Strong, Judgments, supra note 14. Although COCA may eventually
provide some limited assistance in this regard, COCA is not yet in force. See
COCA, supra note 22, arts. 1–2, 8–9; see also supra note 22.
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cedural contracts because some of the difficulties associated
with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
arise because of concerns about the legitimacy of other states’
procedural practices.65 Thus, any process (including, perhaps,
the use of a private procedural agreement) that helps harmonize some of the differences associated with national procedural practices could increase the international enforceability of
civil judgments.66
Fourth and finally, predictability may refer to the actual procedures that are used to resolve the dispute at hand. This issue
was also not discussed in The Bremen.67 However, the common
understanding, both then and now, is that the parties will adhere to the procedural rules applied by the forum court.68 Although this approach may be defensible on policy grounds,69 it is
important to recognize as a factual matter that application of
the forum’s procedural law may not lead to the kind of predictability that commercial actors require. For example, there is no
guarantee that a court designated by the parties can or will accept jurisdiction over any particular matter.70 Furthermore,
research has shown that procedures in the United States can

65. See Strong, Judgments, supra note 14 (discussing systemic and individual due process concerns).
66. See Main, Review, supra note 18, at 471.
67. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13–14.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a
(1971); COLLINS ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 7-002.
69. Judicial efficiency and convenience appear to be the primary policy
rationales, although uniformity can also play a role in some contexts. See
GARNETT, supra note 20, at 10–15 (also discussing rationales based on natural justice, public law, and territorial sovereignty); Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the “Transitory” Cause of Action, 73 HARV. L. REV. 268, 271
n.179 (1959); Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of
Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1245 (2011); James R. Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 432 (1985).
70. For example, parties cannot contract around the requirement of subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). It is also possible for courts to set aside a forum selection provision. See The Bremen, 407
U.S. at 16–17. Certain commentators have suggested that U.S. courts set
aside foreign forum selection clauses with some frequency. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 487–88.
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differ significantly between individual state courts,71 between
state courts and federal courts,72 and even between and within
different federal courts.73 Litigation in the United States is also
said to be subject to a number of unwritten rules of procedure
that makes it difficult for parties, particularly foreign parties,
to anticipate how a dispute will be resolved.74 Differences between the procedural rules of different countries are often even
more extreme.75

71. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1339; Catherine T. Struve, Institutional
Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules
Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1218–29 (2011).
72. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1339; Struve, supra note 71, at 1218–29.
73. Parties proceeding in federal court are subject not only to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure but also to the local rules of that particular court as
well as the rules of the particular judge who hears the case. See FED. R. CIV.
P. Sometimes these rules can vary significantly. Compare Local Rules of
United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtrules.php, with Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York,
http://www.nynd.uscourts.gov/news/nynd-2014-local-rules-effective112014; compare also Individual Rules and Procedures for Judge Shira A.
Scheindlin of the District Court of the Southern District of New York,
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Scheindlin, with Individual Rules and
Procedures for Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the District Court of the Southern
District of New York, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/judge/Kaplan. These individual rules can sometimes be outcome-determinative. See Chevron Corp. v.
Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2013 WL 5548913, *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7,
2013); BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 1.
74. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and
Fact in an Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1981, 1983 (2004) (discussing an informal procedural system that “has no
procedural rulebook, is largely ignored in law schools, and is seldom mentioned by judges. Yet it is a methodical and logical system that civil litigators
are aware of and, increasingly, rely upon as a necessary complement to the
formal system”). Judges are also given a great deal of discretion in how they
decide certain matters, which further compounds the litigants’ procedural
uncertainty. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural
Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2007) (“If we were not so accustomed to broad trial judge discretion over procedure, we would probably think
it a rather strange way to manage the litigation environment.”); Robert E.
Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U.
PITT. L. REV. 853, 854–55 (1989) (noting excessive judicial discretion can violate the rule of law); S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States
Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 530–32 (2010) [hereinafter
Strong, Discovery].
75. See Main, Review, supra note 18, at 468.
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Together, these features suggest that the rules of civil procedure may not be as uniform—and hence predictable—as is
commonly believed to be the case.76 Indeed, Professor Judith
Resnik has suggested that a variety of “mini-codes of civil procedure are being created by [U.S.] courts, agencies, and a multitude of private providers.”77 As a result, “[t]he aspiration for a
trans-substantive procedural regime embedded in the Federal
Rules has been supplanted by an array of contextualized processes.”78
Although forum selection provisions were the first type of international procedural contracts contemplated by the United
States Supreme Court, they were not the last. The Court has
also considered the validity of arbitration agreements as “specialized kind[s] of forum-selection clause[s].”79 Predictability
also figures largely in discussions relating to these types of
agreements.
For example, one of the earliest cases on international commercial arbitration, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., stated that
uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any
contract touching two or more countries, each with its own
substantive laws and conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall
be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness
and predictability essential to any international business
transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to
a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved.
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an
international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate
76. See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of TransSubstantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 373 (2010)
[hereinafter Marcus, Past].
77. Resnik, supra note 11, at 597–98.
78. Id. at 597. Some scholars have questioned whether it is even appropriate to aspire to a trans-substantive approach to procedural law. See Robert
M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L. J. 718, 732–39 (1975). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices
and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244–47 (1989) (defending trans-substantivity in procedural
law).
79. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
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these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation
advantages.80

Scherk therefore reinforced the principle enunciated in The
Bremen that parties need predictability (and hence autonomy)
with respect to both the place where a dispute will be heard
and the substantive law that will apply.81 However, Scherk
went one step further and also protected the parties’ ability to
choose the procedures by which their dispute is resolved.82 In
reaching its decision, the Court held that arbitration agreements are enforceable to the same extent and for the same reasons as forum selection clauses, particularly in the international realm.83
The Supreme Court’s support for predictability in dispute
resolution processes reached its zenith in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., which stated that
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the
need of the international commercial system for predictability
in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would
be forthcoming in a domestic context.84

These decisions show how respect for procedural autonomy
has evolved in the United States over time. In each of these
cases, the Supreme Court has overcome a tradition of judicial
hostility to the various practices due to the need to encourage
80. Id. at 516–17 (footnote omitted).
81. See id. at 518; see also M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
82. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 (noting that an arbitration agreement
“posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving
the dispute”). The final type of predictability involves enforcement of the decision arising out of the arbitration or litigation. Arbitration is clearly the
better process in this regard, since parties can take advantage of one of the
numerous international treaties facilitating the recognition and enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 68–71. However,
this principle was not discussed in Scherk, since the Court was addressing
the enforcement of an arbitration agreement, not an arbitral award. See
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519–20.
83. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518–19 (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9, 13–
14).
84. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 629 (1985) (emphasis added).
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predictability in international commerce.85 As a result, private
procedural contracts stand a good chance of being upheld if
they can be shown to promote predictability in international
commercial transactions.
When making this argument, parties would be well-advised
to demonstrate how private procedural contracts increase predictability in the interpretation and application of substantive
law, since the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently focused on
substantive concerns in its discussions of procedural autonomy.
As it turns out, there are several ways to tie procedural contracts to matters involving substantive law. For example, the
notion that procedure is neutral with respect to outcome has
come under increased attack in recent years,86 and parties are
increasingly engaging in “forum shopping for jurisdictions in
which procedural law has a likelihood of affecting the favourable resolution of a dispute when those transactions or relationships sour.”87 As a result, it appears increasingly likely that
parties in an international transaction will use both a forum
selection provision and a choice of law agreement, which could
mean that the court chosen to resolve a particular dispute is

85. See id. at 625; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516; The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9–10.
Some of this antipathy was based on the influence of “Joseph Beale, the reporter for the First Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, who condemned choiceof-law clauses as conferring the equivalent of legislative power on the contracting parties” and noting judicial “hostility towards choice-of-law clauses
was [based on] the sense that they represented an impermissible usurpation
of state power.” Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2076 (2009); see also Joseph H. Beale,
What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract: III. Theoretical and Practical
Criticisms of the Authorities, 23 HARV. L. REV. 260, 261 (1910). However, these sentiments have been rejected not only with respect to substantive choice
of law provisions but also with respect to forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements. See Miller & Eisenberg, supra, at 2076; see also The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12 (discussing ouster of judicial jurisdiction through forum
selection clauses); PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
16–17 (2013) (discussing the concept that arbitration ousts the jurisdiction of
the courts).
86. See GARNETT, supra note 20, at 15–43; Sagi Peari, Book Review, 14
MELB. J. INT’L L. 304, 309–10 (2013) (reviewing GARNETT, supra note 20) (discussing how damages calculations can be affected by the substantiveprocedural divide).
87. Donald K. Anton, Book Review, 60 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 489, 490 (2013)
(reviewing GARNETT, supra note 20).
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not an expert in the substantive principles that apply.88 However, some parties could want to have their disputes heard by a
court that is expert in the substantive law that has been chosen
but not want to expose themselves to a particular procedure,
such as U.S.-style discovery. Since it is highly improbable at
this point that states will curtail parties’ ability to choose the
substantive law that governs their contracts,89 other steps
must be taken to minimize the effect that procedural disparities have on substantive outcomes. Individualized procedural
contracts may be one way to address that issue.
Another time-honored axiom that has recently come under
fire involves the purported distinction between substance and
procedure. Not only have numerous authorities recognized the
impossibility of drawing strict lines between substance and
procedure,90 but several scholars have noted how the substantive law is often built on certain assumptions regarding the
shape of the applicable procedural law.91 As a result, it could
very well be argued that claims made under foreign law should
be decided under the procedural laws of that jurisdiction, at
least in some regards, so as to take into account the legal environment that generated that particular substantive right and
minimize the possibility of either underregulating or overregulating certain behaviors through the use of foreign procedural
mechanisms.92 A more liberal approach to procedural autonomy
88. See Anton, supra note 87, at 490 (noting that the “internationally disparate procedural advantages and disadvantages tied to traditional lex fori
rule can undermine the ‘uniformity’ of result of cases arising outside of the
forum”).
89. Indeed, it appears as if states are moving toward increased autonomy
in choice of substantive law. See Draft Hague Principles, supra note 3;
Symeonides, supra note 1, at 875–76.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. b (1971);
COLLINS ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 7-004; Anton, supra note 87, at 489.
91. See Main, Substantive, supra note 20, at 802; see also Peari, supra note
86, at 305. For example, a party might not be able to prove all the elements of
a fraud claim arising under U.S. law unless U.S.-style discovery is permitted.
Most civil law nations use adverse inferences and shifts in the burden of
proof to avoid the need for discovery in these types of scenarios. See Hazard,
Secrets, supra note 15, at 1682. However, it is unclear whether adverse inferences and burden-shifting would lead to the same substantive outcome as
U.S.-style discovery or vice versa.
92. At this point, international commercial arbitration appears to be superior to litigation because arbitration permits an increased amount of jurisprudential consistency between substantive and procedural law while never-
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might increase consistency between substantive and procedural
law.
Finally, parties seeking to find a link between procedural
contracts and predictability could attempt to demonstrate that
the use of harmonized procedures could increase the enforceability of civil judgments across national borders.93 Although
predictability of enforcement is not precisely the same as predictability of substantive choice of law, the two goals are mutually consistent, since an unenforceable judgment is as bad as
(or worse than) a judgment rendered pursuant to the wrong
substantive law.94 Therefore, courts could view any mechanism
that increases the international enforceability of civil judgments as an effective means of promoting international commercial activity.95
B. Frequency of Procedural Contracts in Practice
Although private procedural contracts would appear to increase predictability in international commercial litigation, it is
unclear whether and to what extent parties are actually attheless allowing the parties to exercise procedural autonomy in other regards.
This phenomenon does not arise as a result of any formal requirement that
parties and arbitrators choose procedures that align with the substantive law
governing the dispute. Instead, the alignment of procedure and substance
occurs as a result of international arbitration’s core values of procedural flexibility and harmonization of common law and civil law practices. Because
arbitrators are allowed to adopt procedures that are tailored to the dispute
and the parties, arbitral awards may be more consistent with judgments of
the courts whose law has been chosen to control the substance of the dispute
than judgments from foreign courts, since judges are at this point unable or
unwilling to adopt procedures akin to those used in the country whose law
controls the substance of the dispute.
93. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text.
94. A judgment rendered pursuant to the wrong substantive law might
still reach the same outcome as would have occurred under the law chosen by
the parties. However,”[a]n unenforceable judgment is at best valueless; at
worst a source of additional loss.” Alexander Hansebout, The International
Dimension of the Attachment of Debts, 4 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 219, 219 (2010).
95. Notably, a procedural contract could increase international enforcement in two ways. First, a procedural contract may make a party more amenable to suit in a jurisdiction where assets are located, thereby removing the
need to seek international enforcement of the resulting judgment. Second, a
procedural contract may make the litigation process more familiar to a foreign court that will then be more inclined to recognize and enforce the resulting judgment. See Strong, Judgments, supra note 14 (discussing systemic and
individual due process concerns).
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tempting to adopt such contracts in practice.96 Indeed, there
are a number of reasons why parties may be disinclined to
adopt these sorts of provisions.
For example, some parties may worry about the enforceability of individualized procedural contracts.97 Other parties may
prefer to use arbitration, particularly in international disputes,
because arbitration offers various benefits—such as the easy
enforceability of foreign awards—in addition to the possibility
of customized procedures.98 Still other parties may simply be
unaware that individualized court procedures are possible. Finally, some parties may be influenced by inertia, or what might
be called “the norm-creating power of the factual.”99
This final proposition is particularly intriguing because it can
be tied to the notion of defaults, a concept that is of some interest in the area of procedural contracts.100 For example, some
theorists believe that
when lawmakers anoint a contract term [or legislative provision as] the default, the substantive preferences of contracting
parties shift—that term becomes more desirable, and other
competing terms becoming less desirable. Put another way,
contracting parties view default terms as part of the status
quo, and they prefer the status quo to alternative states, all
other things equal.101

Although parties may prefer to retain the status quo, research suggests that individuals will begin to exercise their
right (or, in more innovative contexts, test their right) to opt
out of a default provision if and when the default becomes undesirable under a standard cost-benefit analysis.102 This phe96. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1346; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 393–94.
97. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 161; Hoffman, supra note 7, at
424–25.
98. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1351–52; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 423–
24; S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due
Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 70–81 (2008) [hereinafter Strong, Due Process].
99. Gunnar Beck, Legitimation Crisis, Reifying Human Rights and the
Norm-Creating Power of the Factual: Reply to “Reifying Law: Let Them Be
Lions,” 26 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 565, 568 (2008) (citation omitted).
100. Id.
101. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 611–12 (1998).
102. See Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (2013). An interesting notion relates to how
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nomenon is illustrated in the procedural realm through the rise
in national103 and international104 arbitration as satisfaction
with similar forms of litigation fell.
Conventional wisdom holds that legal developments take
place steadily and incrementally.105 However, empirical research suggests that innovation occurs “when sufficient, highly
salient, exogenous shocks commence to rattle the status
quo.”106 Interestingly, the world of procedural law seems to
have recently experienced two of these types of “shocks.”107
First, the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions
concerning class arbitration have caused numerous commentators to question the limits of procedural autonomy in both arbitration and litigation.108 For years, observers had believed that
parties would be unable to waive class proceedings in arbitration because such actions were assumed to be impermissible in
the judicial realm.109 However, scholars are now wondering
whether the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold various types
hard it is to contract out of a default provision. See Brett H. McDonnell,
Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383,
390 (2007); see also infra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
103. For example, the increase in domestic arbitration in the United States
can be tied to corporations’ desire to limit the possibility of class action litigation, which was seen as both expensive and risky. See S.I. STRONG, CLASS,
MASS, AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
¶ 1.16 (2013) [hereinafter STRONG, CLASS].
104. The increased use of international commercial arbitration can be
linked to parties’ desire to reduce the unpredictability and expense of transnational litigation. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 76–78, 85–86.
105. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 425, 428; see also Stephen J. Choi & G.
Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination
of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 929 (2004).
106. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 428; see also id. at 425 (suggesting the “more
common pattern is for the market as a whole to shift rather quickly to a new
term or set of terms after a period of experimentation and innovation in different possibilities” rather than through slow, incremental change).
107. Id. at 428; see also Dodge, supra note 30, at 729; Paulson, supra note
25, at 473.
108. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312
(2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751–53 (2011);
STRONG, CLASS, supra note 103, ¶¶ 4.76–4.121; Bone, supra note 30, at 1362–
67; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 520–64; Dodge, supra note 30, at
776–83; Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1103; Hoffman, supra note 7,
at 428; Paulson, supra note 25, at 471; Resnik, supra note 11, at 609–22.
109. See Hans Smit, Class Actions and Their Waiver in Arbitration, 15 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 199, 203 (2004).
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of class waivers in arbitration can be read as supporting an expansive view of procedural autonomy that extends beyond the
arbitral context.110
Second, globalization has led to an ever-increasing amount of
transnational litigation,111 thereby generating a “growing need
for legal certainty in a world where people and corporations
have seemingly unfettered mobility.”112 Up until this point, international commercial actors’ desire for both predictability
and familiarity has been met through arbitration. However, a
growing dissatisfaction with the cost and formality of international commercial arbitration could drive parties to consider
the use of individualized procedural contracts.113 Modified
forms of litigation may be particularly attractive to the everincreasing number of small and medium sized enterprises
(“SMEs”) that are now engaged in transnational commerce,
since many of these smaller entities either may be unaware of
the benefits of international commercial arbitration or may
find the costs associated with arbitration to be prohibitively
high.114
110. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1333; Dodge, supra note 30, at 781;
Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1106–07; Hoffman, supra note 7, at
428; Resnik, supra note 11, at 599.
111. See Katy Dowell, International Litigants in London Rise by a Third in
Three Years, LAWYER (May 7, 2013), http://www.thelawyer.com/news-andanalysis/practice-areas/litigation/international-litigants-in-london-rise-by-athird-in-three-years/3004520.article (noting rise of U.S. litigants in English
courts); Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and
Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 37 (2011); William F. Sullivan et al., A
Global Concern: The Rise of International Securities Litigation, BLOOMBERG
L. (Apr. 8, 2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/aglobal-concern-the-rise-of-international-securities-litigation/.
112. Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiv; see also Grossi, supra note
18, at 627.
113. See Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxv (noting the need for “efficiency, transparency, predictability, and procedural economy” in transnational litigation); supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
114. See Giuseppe de Palo & Linda Costabile, Promotion of International
Commercial Arbitration and Other Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques
in Ten Southern Mediterranean Countries, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
303, 303–04 (2006); Mistelis, supra note 33, at 582 (concluding “international
[commercial] arbitration is at least as expensive as litigation for middle and
smaller sized cases”). While international transactions were at one time conducted almost entirely by large, multinational corporations, improvements in
technology and communication have opened global markets to a wide variety
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II. STRUCTURAL CONCERNS ABOUT PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
Having described how and why parties in international commercial transactions have a heightened need or desire for procedural autonomy, it is now time to consider various structural
concerns relating to the exercise of that autonomy through contracts creating individualized litigation procedures. Although
the relevant issues can be viewed from a variety of perspectives,115 perhaps the most compelling way of framing structural
concerns is in terms of a presumption that national rules of civil procedure are non-derogable as a result of “a ‘State sovereignty prerogative.’”116 This approach holds that states are the
only entities entitled to identify procedural norms in litigation
because states are the only bodies that have the right and the
responsibility of ensuring procedural fairness in national
courts.117 Under this model, private attempts to customize procedural rules are presumptively improper because such efforts
necessarily conflict with the state’s conception of procedural
justice.118
Although the notion of a state procedural prerogative dominated the jurisprudential landscape for many years, commentators have recently identified a possible distinction between
the law relating to litigation procedures and the law relating to
judicial organization.119 Under this model, some matters (such
as those involving the relationship between the parties inter se)
might be amenable to private procedural agreements even
though other issues (such as those involving judicial admin-

of participants, including SMEs. See Michael B. Carsella, Payment Methods
in International Trade, in DOING BUSINESS WORLDWIDE: THE FOURTH ANNUAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM FOR THE PRACTITIONER AND INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS EXECUTIVE sec. G, 1, 2 (1998).
115. For example, it is possible to describe structural concerns in terms of
threats to democratic values. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 551.
116. Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii; see also Born, Adjudication,
supra note 10, at 780, 859.
117. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 595–98. States may also have other interests (such as institutional or judicial efficiency) that they wish to further
in litigation. See Andrew Le Sueur, Access to Justice Rights in the United
Kingdom, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 457, 473 (2000).
118. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 596; see also Hoffman, supra note 7, at
392.
119. See Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii (citing authorities).
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istration or the relationship between the parties and the court)
remained within the exclusive control of the state.120
Distinguishing between those procedures that are amenable
to privatization and those that are not can be a difficult task.
In considering these matters, it is useful to adopt both a theoretical and practical methodology, as in the discussion below.
A. Theoretical Perspectives
Structural concerns relating to procedural contracts are particularly well-suited to theoretical analyses, since constitutional and political philosophers have considered questions relating
to institutional design at length and in a variety of contexts. As
a result, matters relating to the privatization of litigation can
be addressed from several different theoretical perspectives.
For example, some commentators have analyzed procedural
contracts through the lens of law and economics.121 This approach suggests “rethink[ing] the rules of procedure as a set of
defaults. To set such defaults, scholars suggest that we look not
simply at typical public law goals, such as distributive fairness
and efficiency, but dynamically, focusing on parties’ strategy,
and consequently on the role of information exchange through
rulemaking.”122
Default rules provide the means of
fill[ing] a gap in a contract where the parties have not selected a different rule. Default rules can be contracted around if
the parties make an explicit choice to do so. . . . On the other

120. See id. Some sources define “judicial administration” as including matters relating to “the proper form of action, service of process, pleading, rules
of discovery, mode of trial and execution and costs.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §122 & cmt. a (1971). However, other authorities use
“judicial administration” to describe matters relating to internal organization
and institutional design. See Zoltán Fleck, A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Power, Organisational Issues in Judicature and the Administration of
Courts, 27 IUS GENTIUM 3, 11–23 (2014); Russell R. Wheeler, Roscoe Pound
and the Evolution of Judicial Administration, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 943, 943
(2007). This Article will adopt the latter convention unless otherwise indicated.
121. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1391; Dodge, supra note 30, at 755; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 394 Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex Ante, supra note 30, at
1492; see also PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Chris William Sanchirico
ed., 2012).
122. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 394; see also Glenn, supra note 21, at 490.
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hand, a mandatory or immutable rule is one that the parties
cannot contract around. . . .
Efficiency theory, in general, supports the use of default rules,
not mandatory rules. Indeed, law and economics scholars
have long fought against the use of “immutable rules, including those based on public policy.”123

Therefore, proponents of a law and economics approach
would permit parties to adopt individualized procedural contracts so long as the parties can adequately protect their interests.124 Since no evidence yet exists suggesting that procedural
contracts result in an abuse of rights, proponents of law and
economics would permit parties to engage in these sorts of private contracts.
This model doubtless will be persuasive to some observers.
However, a pure law and economics approach to procedural
contracts gives rise to several concerns. First, efficiency-based
arguments have been said to be problematic in cases involving
procedural rights because “[i]n many private relations, . . .
courts and other decisionmakers have not allowed what would
be the most efficient ‘Coasean’ result.”125

123. Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theory and the Failure of PublicPrivate Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2232 (2013) (citation omitted).
124. See Robert Gertner & Ian Ayres, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989) (“Immutability is justified only if unregulated contracting would be socially deleterious
because parties internal or external to the contract cannot adequately protect
themselves.”).
125. Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The Integration of Fairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 261
(1998); see also Paulson, supra note 25, at 526. Indeed, litigation currently
reflects a multitude of inefficient practices that have been adopted for various
reasons, including those relating to procedural fairness. See Janet Cooper
Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 647 (1994); Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 723 (2010); Jonathan R.
Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 627, 627 (1994). Furthermore, one of the United States’ most
hallowed procedural practices, U.S.-style discovery, is extremely inefficient.
See Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring
the Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 849 (2012);
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1690. Other jurisdictions achieve similar ends
without the same degree of inefficiency. See Strong, Discovery, supra note 74,
at 509–12.
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Second, using law and economics to consider the propriety of
procedural contracts seems inappropriate to many observers,
given the type of issues that are at stake.126 For example, proponents of law and economics have suggested that “the focus of
civil procedure rules should be to minimize transaction costs,
not to maximize procedural justice.”127 Although there is value
in trying to find ways to rationalize various fields of law, many
people would be hesitant to set aside procedural fairness in favor of transactional efficiency.
However, law and economics is not the only theory available.
It is also possible to analyze private procedural contracts from
a deontological perspective.128 One potential model involves
John Rawls’s concept of “justice as fairness,” which has been
said to constitute the strongest and most popular response to
consequentialist legal theories such as law and economics.129
Rawls’s work also provides a useful response to the preceding
analysis because he “has, on the whole, provided a much more
penetrating account of our basic constitutional liberties than
the law and economics movement has been able to articulate.”130
Rawls’s work is also particularly relevant here because the
method by which he constructs his theory of justice as fairness
is highly analogous to the way in which procedural contracts
are most likely to arise. For example, his concept of “justice as
fairness” is based on the concept of the “veil of ignorance,”
which involves

126. See Robin Bradley Kar, Contract Law and the Second-Person Standpoint: Why Efficiency-Maximization Principles Can Neither Explain Nor Justify the Expectation Damages Remedy, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 977, 980 (2007).
127. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 402.
128. See Beck, supra note 99, at 579–80.
129. Compare JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (2001)
[hereinafter RAWLS, RESTATEMENT], and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY], with RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (7th ed. 2007), and Beck, supra note 99, at 579–80
(noting law and economics constitutes a consequentialist theory). Rawls’s
work has also been described as contractarian, which would correspond nicely
with the types of issues at stake in this discussion. See Swygert & Yanes,
supra note 125, at 300; see also Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REV. 761, 775 (2013) (discussing Rawls’s place among social
contract theorists).
130. Kar, supra note 126, at 979 n.10.
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what agreement the parties would reach if they were able to
bargain costlessly and ex ante, assuming that they have full
knowledge of all of the costs, benefits, and alternatives available to each of them, but that they do not know which party to
the agreement they will be. Any agreement that the parties
would reach under these assumptions is one that will resolve
the distortions caused by disparities in bargaining power
within non-competitive markets. Any consequent agreement
will be mutually accommodative in attempting to preserve
each party’s original utility gain. In short, it will be based on
a hypothetical consensus involving a condition of hidden identity and a principle of constructive empathy, together with the
influence of the social norms of risk aversion and perceived
fairness.131

Although this passage was written with Rawls’s work in
mind, the text also describes the type of bargaining that goes
on when commercial parties are deciding what kind of dispute
resolution mechanism to include in their transactional documents.132 Since it is extremely difficult to anticipate at the time
of contracting precisely what kinds of disputes might eventually arise, commercial actors have to identify a mechanism that
will be fair regardless of how the parties are eventually situated to one another.133
The methodological similarities between the construction of
justice as fairness and individualized procedural contracts sug131. Swygert & Yanes, supra note 125, at 264–65; see also RAWLS,
RESTATEMENT, supra note 129, at 15–18; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 129, pt.
1, ch. III, § 24. Although this passage focuses on justice as “empathy,” the
concept of empathy is simply a more particularized means of describing justice as fairness. See Swygert & Yanes, supra note 125, at 291–95. Fairness
can also be framed in the terms described herein (i.e., as synonymous with
the principles of equality of arms and the ability to present one’s case). See
infra notes 338–40 and accompanying text.
132. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 13–14.
133. See id. Some commentators suggest that the lack of knowledge can be
problematic. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 525; Thomas Schultz, Human
Rights: A Speed Bump for Arbitral Procedures? An Exploration of Safeguards
in the Acceleration of Justice, 9 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 1, 14 (2006) (suggesting
pre-dispute waivers of procedural rights may only be possible if there is “true
informed consent” or if special circumstances exist). However, the rules committee of the Judicial Conference operated in a similar type of information
vacuum when it created trans-substantive rules of procedure, so there is litigation-oriented precedent for allowing pre-dispute agreements relating to
procedure to stand. See supra note 78 (discussing propriety of transsubstantive approach to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

2014]

PROCEDURAL CHOICE OF LAW

1057

gest that Rawls would be in favor of these types of private
agreements. However, the fit between Rawls’s theory and procedural contracts is not perfect. For example, some people
might object to using justice as fairness as a means of legitimizing procedural contracts because
[t]he conventional view of Rawlsian political philosophy is
that the private law lies outside the scope of the two principles of justice—it is not part of the “basic structure” of society,
which, in this view, is limited to basic constitutional liberties
and the state’s system of tax and transfer.134

Of course, this sort of public law-oriented approach may be precisely what makes Rawls’s work so appropriate in the current
context, since questions of procedure have traditionally been
treated as public law concerns falling within the sovereign prerogative.135
Problems and possibilities therefore exist at both ends of the
ideological spectrum. However, the two theories do not necessarily have to be viewed as polar opposites, at least in this context.136 Instead, it may be possible to identify a third approach
to procedural contracts based on “a unified theory of justice in
which a concept of fairness . . . is integrated into an efficiency

134. Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law,
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 598, 632 (2005); see also Swygert & Yanes, supra
note 125, at 258. Interestingly, the law and economics approach has met with
similar criticisms about its suitability in certain areas of law, including private law. See Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003) (“[T]he economic
approach does not explain the current system of contract law, nor does it provide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming contract law.”).
135. See Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii; see also Born, Adjudication, supra note 10, at 780. There are also ways in which contract law can be
brought within the Rawlsian fold, although such analyses are beyond the
scope of the current Article. See Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 134, at
600 (suggesting that “private ordering, specifically contract law, must be
viewed as subject to the demands of the two principles of justice” and that
“Rawlsian political philosophy, properly understood, is not neutral over conceptions of private ordering. For Rawlsianism, contract law is properly understood as one of the many loci of distributive justice”); Swygert & Yanes,
supra note 125, at 258 (noting that “[a]lthough Rawls never applied his thesis
to allocations of private rights and entitlements, two UCLA professors, Wesley Liebeler (law) and Armen Alchian (economics), have done so by developing a Hobbsean-Rawlsean ex ante contractarian rationale”).
136. See Swygert & Yanes, supra note 125, at 255–57.
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construct that acknowledges and responds to influences of social norms.”137 Thus, for example,
Rawls’s assumption that the parties to a consensus have limited knowledge about themselves under a “veil of ignorance”
provides a theoretical way to create constructive empathy.
Although Rawls primarily applied this restrictive knowledge
assumption to the derivation of principles for public law, . . .
by adding to the Coase Theorem a condition of “hidden identity,” both efficiency and fairness considerations can be integrated into the realm of private law.138

This blended approach seems to resolve a number of the problems associated with each of the two theories in their pure form
and provides a useful theoretical justification for privatized
procedural contracts. Not only does this third model explain
past behavior in this area of law (i.e., why courts have allowed
procedural autonomy in cases involving forum selection clauses
and international commercial arbitration), it also provides a
useful analytical paradigm describing how parties can overcome various structural obstacles relating to the proper roles of
public and private actors. Thus, there appears to be a sufficient
amount of theoretical support for private parties to create their
own procedural contracts, since such agreements not only allow
individuals to maximize their own procedural efficiency but also allow the state to assert its institutional role in protecting
certain fundamental notions of procedural fairness.139
B. Practical Perspectives
As useful as theoretical models can be, problems can arise
when those theories are put into practice, since reality may
generate the need to make certain distinctions and exceptions
to the original construct.140 Therefore, it is useful to consider
procedural contracts in practical context.141
137. Id. at 251.
138. Id. at 264.
139. See infra notes 330–53 and accompanying text (describing the standards of procedural fairness).
140. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena,
Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.KENT L. REV. 683, 693 (2002) (concluding that “judges . . . are looking for answers to discrete questions, not solutions grounded in grand theory”); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in International and
Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Con-
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1. Unbundling the Analysis
One of the problems in this area of law is the tendency to
consider all procedural practices as analytically similar when
in fact different procedural rules serve different structural
purposes. For example, some procedures govern matters of judicial administration while others dictate the relationship between the litigants and the court.142 Still other rules can be interpreted as involving no one but the parties themselves.143
Therefore, it is necessary to deconstruct the analysis so as to
understand precisely what is at stake in any individual situation.144
Interestingly, it has only recently become necessary to make
these sorts of fine distinctions, since the earliest forms of procedural contracts (i.e., forum selection clauses) were made on a
holistic basis, with parties simply choosing a particular forum
and accepting that court’s procedural requirements in toto.145
texts, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 319, 329 (2003); Jordan M. Steiker, “Post” Liberalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1996) (reviewing ROBERT C. POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995))
(discussing problems of overgeneralization in grand theory); Jane Stapleton,
Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused “Middle Theory,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 531, 532 (2002) (suggesting “middle theory” is more
persuasive to judges).
141. Some commentators believe there is a relative paucity of available case
law in this field, although that view is not universally held. Compare Hoffman, supra note 7 at 393 (suggesting there is little case law in this field) with
Noyes, supra note 27, at 599 (stating that “[c]ourts have enforced ex ante
contracts that modify a broad array of litigation rights and rules,” including
those involving “constitutional rights, statutory rights, rights set forth in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and rights set forth in the Federal Rules of
Evidence”).
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (1971);
Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii.
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (1971);
Sánchez-Cordero, supra note 10, at xxxiii.
144. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 140, at 329 (suggesting the usefulness
of narrower analyses).
145. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 134 S.Ct. 568, 579–80
(2013); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–97 (1991); M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1972). The
Restatement reflects this type of approach to the extent it contemplates the
selection of one public procedural system over another rather than the choice
of a private system of procedure over a public set of rules. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §122 & cmts. a, b (1971); Dodge, supra note
30, at 739, 744.
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However, the question now is whether and to what extent parties can bypass the kind of “bundled” procedural choices inherent in choice of forum provisions (i.e., an undifferentiated combination of “forum, decision maker, and procedural rules”) and
instead opt for an “unbundled” approach that allows the selection of “individual procedures to create a customized ‘mini-code
of civil procedure.’”146 Under the latter model, parties would be
permitted to dispose of the rules set out by the forum and
“agree to a different pleading standard, different timing and
other conditions for raising defenses, limitations on joinder of
additional parties, limitations on discovery, different summary
judgment standards, shortened time for the pretrial stage, and
so on.”147
Critics of procedural contracts have claimed that “[t]he conversion of procedural rules from publicly created, mandatory
guarantors of procedural justice to default rules subject to
market forces” is problematic from a structural standpoint,
since such measures could “alter[] the nature and function of
civil procedure at a basic level.”148 However, there may be a
way to differentiate between various procedures so as to identify those rules that may be amenable to customization.
a. Public Versus Private Concerns
The first way to separate permissible from impermissible
procedural contracts is to focus on whether the procedure in
question is private in nature (i.e., only implicating the relationship between the parties inter se) or whether it is public (i.e.,
affecting the court in some way).149 Structurally, there can be
few concerns if the agreement is entirely private.150
The problem of course is that distinctions between public and
private concerns are far easier to make in the abstract than in
146. Dodge, supra note 30, at 732.
147. Bone, supra note 30, at 1345; see also Dodge, supra note 30, at 746.
Parties in the United States can also agree to waive the constitutional right
to a jury or agree not to enter objections to the introduction of certain types of
evidence. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1348–49; see also U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2; Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 391–98 (1987).
148. Dodge, supra note 30, at 725; see also Hoffman, supra note 7, at 401–
02.
149. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
150. Of course, various substantive concerns could arise, as discussed below. See infra notes 262–386 and accompanying text.
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practice. Indeed, almost every procedural matter can be framed
in terms of both public and private concerns.151
For example, procedural contracts purporting to modify the
rules of pleading could be characterized as entirely private in
nature. Under this perspective, parties could be seen as simply
expressing a desire to clarify the type of information that must
be provided to each other at the time of filing in a post-Iqbal,
post-Twombly world.152 Private agreements regarding pleading
issues might even be seen as economically prudent because
such agreements can decrease costly litigation about pleading
standards153 and increase the likelihood of settlement by
providing more or better information about the facts underlying a particular claim or defense at the time of filing.154
However, pleading issues can also be framed as affecting public rights or interests.155 For example, making pleading standards more lenient could affect institutional design issues by allowing parties to bring cases that might otherwise be facially
insufficient as a matter of law, thereby clogging judicial dockets.156 Making pleading standards more rigorous could affect
other institutional design concerns by limiting parties’ ability
to assert particular claims or defenses, thereby affecting the
substantive rights of the parties and perhaps even leaving

151. Some commentators have suggested that matters relating to timing of
various procedures, class action status, bonds relating to injunctions, burdens
of proof, discovery, and the introduction of evidence might be considered
purely private procedures. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 398–400; Strong,
Consensual, supra note 30, at 161. However, other commentators have opposed this view. See Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex Ante, supra note 30, at 1493–
94; Paulson, supra note 25, at 511–22 (arguing that rules relating to evidence
are public in nature).
152. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
153. There is some confusion about how the Supreme Court decisions in
Iqbal and Twombly are to be applied. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662; Twombly,
550 U.S. at 544; Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in
Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal
Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 339 (2013).
154. See Miller, supra note 153, at 358.
155. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 398–402; Miller, supra note 153, at 365–
67.
156. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 528. Alternatively, customizing the
pleading standard could be framed as “impracticable.” BORN, DRAFTING, supra
note 2, at 161.
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them without a remedy.157 While a defensible compromise position does exist (i.e., parties may agree to make their individual
pleading standard more rigorous than that established as a
matter of law but may not agree to a more lenient standard),
this exercise demonstrates the kinds of matters that must be
considered before a court can determine whether a particular
procedure is amenable to customization as a structural matter.
When attempting to determine whether a particular procedure is public or private in nature, it may be helpful to ask
whether “the contract require[s] the judge (as opposed to the
parties) to act in a different way or make a decision under a
different standard” and whether “the contract impose[s] a burden on the court that is inconsistent with sound judicial administration.”158 These two questions address the two main structural concerns associated with procedural contracts, namely
procedures that affect the relationship between the court and
the parties and procedures that affect judicial administration.
Another way to frame these types of structural analyses is to
consider whether the procedural contract in question somehow
affects certain core values of public adjudication.159 Professor
Robert Bone has suggested that this inquiry could be carried
out through a functional comparison of litigation and arbitration.160
In Bone’s view, litigation involves the quintessentially public
task of enforcing the substantive law while arbitration focuses
157. Some commentators have suggested that procedural contracts should
not change the outcome of a dispute. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 524, 529.
However, this perspective seems somewhat anomalous, since parties are able
to choose the substantive law that governs their dispute, regardless of the
fact that such decisions will often have a bearing on the outcome of the matter. See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 143–44 (2d. Cir. 2010) (noting difference of outcome under New York versus Swiss law).
158. Paulson, supra note 25, at 528.
159. For example, some commentators claim that the core duties of a judge
are restricted by procedural contracts because the court is a necessary third
party participant in the contract. See id. at 475–76. Other authors dispute
this characterization. See Noyes, supra note 27, at 632. However, the analogy
to third party contracts may be relevant to some types of contracts (i.e., those
that affect matters of institutional design) but not others (i.e., those that affect the relationship between the parties inter se).
160. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1386–88; see also Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 43, at 339, 342, 357 (describing equivalence
functionalism).
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solely on the resolution of a particular dispute.161 However, the
“core distinctiveness” of litigation
lies in its commitment to reasoning from general principle
and doing so in a way that engages the facts of particular cases. Although respecting precedent does not follow inevitably
from this commitment, it is closely linked to it either pragmatically (e.g., following precedent limits cognitive error,
saves decision costs, or protects reliance interests) or morally
(e.g., following precedent is required by equal concern and respect or a norm of integrity, which also supports the core
commitment to principled reasoning).162

Bone’s observations “point[] us in a productive direction for
thinking about party rulemaking. If parties choose procedural
rules that undermine the capacity of judges, and perhaps even
juries, to engage in principled reasoning of the right sort, then
perhaps their choices should not be honored.”163 However, Bone
admits that this approach “is just a beginning, . . . for we must
explain how procedure is connected to principled reasoning and
why parties to a particular case should be constrained if they
bear the risks and costs of their own choices.”164
These commentators appear to suggest the need to conduct
case-by-case analyses of various procedures to determine
whether and to what extent those practices affect public versus
private concerns. Although this process may appear laborintensive, courts have already begun to address these issues, as
discussed in the practical analysis below.
b. Efficiency
Another structural issue that courts and commentators may
wish to consider when evaluating the propriety of individualized judicial procedures involves efficiency and the associated

161. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1386–88.
162. Id. at 1388 (citation omitted). Because Bone is writing from the U.S.
perspective, his analysis is largely rooted in principles associated with the
common law tradition. Translating his hypothesis into a civil law context
would require judges to keep faith with the relevant statutes. Interestingly,
some people believe that U.S. law is becoming more like the civil law, due to
the increased incidence of statutory and regulatory law. See GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5–7 (1982).
163. Bone, supra note 30, at 1388.
164. Id.
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need for uniformity.165 While this Article’s foray into legal theory has suggested that procedural contracts should not be evaluated solely in light of efficiency rationales, a hybrid approach
that takes efficiency concerns into account does appear appropriate.166
The traditional conflict of law rule regarding procedure (i.e.,
that the procedural law of the forum court prevails on a holistic
basis) is based in large part on the assumption that uniformity
in procedural matters is necessary because it promotes efficiency in the courts.167 Because most jurisdictions assert a state
interest in judicial efficiency,168 the longstanding assumption
appears to have been that there must necessarily be a state interest in procedural uniformity.169
However, this analysis reflects a type of syllogistic fallacy
that fails as a matter of logic.170 Furthermore, the underlying
assumptions demonstrate a number of factual errors.
First and foremost, the current rules of civil procedure are
not as uniform as some people appear to believe. For example,
165. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 479–84; see also Main, Review, supra
note 18, at 471–74 (discussing the rationales underlying the desire for uniformity).
166. See supra notes 121–39 and accompanying text.
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (1971);
Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819, 819
(2007); Keeton, supra note 74, at 854, 860 (noting consistency also promotes
justice by avoiding arbitrariness); Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167,
1250 (2005).
168. See Le Sueur, supra note 117, at 473.
169. While it is possible that a need for uniformity could exist as a substantive matter, that issue should be considered separately from structural considerations. See infra notes 262–386 and accompanying text. Indeed, an excessive wish for uniformity could, like an excessive desire for efficiency, lead
to unjust ends. See Adam A. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601,
651–52 (2006) (discussing Robert Dworkin and the possibility of diminishing
returns in terms of procedural processes). Furthermore, scholars have questioned the wisdom of a fully trans-substantive procedural regime as well as
the extent to which trans-substantivity currently exists in the United States.
See supra note 78.
170. See IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 189 (13th
ed. 2008) (discussing the problem of the undistributed middle term); Stephen
M. Rice, Indiscernible Logic: Using the Logical Fallacies of the Illicit Major
Term and the Illicit Minor Term as Litigation Tools, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
101, 116–20 (2010).
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not only do many jurisdictions “delegate broad discretion to trial judges to tailor procedures to case-specific circumstances,”171
but many countries also allow a significant amount of diversity
between and within different courts operating within the same
legal system.172 This lack of commitment to uniformity by public institutions and actors suggests that procedural contracts
cannot be considered jurisprudentially suspect simply because
they result in a certain degree of procedural variation.173
Second, existing rules of civil procedure are not always efficient.174 A number of these inefficiencies can be explained by a
need to take other concerns, such as procedural fairness, into
account.175 However, some inefficiencies arise as a result of
other, more questionable influences.176 These latter practices
give rise to doubts about whether the state has a defensible interest in efficiency such that private parties should not be able
to customize their litigation procedures.
Third and finally, there does not appear to be any demonstrable link between efficiency and uniformity. While procedural diversity could very well create logistical problems (and
therefore adjudicatory inefficiencies) when parties attempt to
affect the relationship between the parties and the court, it is
difficult to identify any efficiency-related concerns in cases
where the parties want to alter the relationship between the
parties inter se. Indeed, some commentators have claimed that
individualized procedures can actually promote efficiency for
both the parties and the courts.177 For example,
terms that specify the location in which disputes will be resolved can allow parties to minimize travel costs. Contractual
provisions to curtail discovery might make sense . . . in disputes that are expected to turn on a court’s interpretation of a
171. Bone, supra note 30, at 1371 (citation omitted).
172. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 597–98; see also supra notes 71–73 and
accompanying text.
173. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1371–72.
174. See Alexander, supra note 125, at 647; Gensler, supra note 125, at 723.
175. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
176. For example, it has been said that “the rules of procedure are formulated by judges. If the self-interest of those judges conflicts with the efficiency
criterion, it would seem plausible that the judges will formulate procedural
rules that further their own interests rather than the interests of efficiency.”
Macey, supra note 125, at 627; see also Samaha, supra note 169, at 665–66.
177. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 526–29, 531–32; see also
Dodge, supra note 30, at 746.
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limited number of documents. . . . Terms that designate a
bench trial allow parties to choose adjudicators with professional expertise and avoid any additional delay or uncertainty
associated with jury trials. Terms that provide for confidential proceedings allow parties to protect sensitive trade secrets. Terms that restrict class actions allow parties to forestall frivolous litigation initiated by self-interested attorneys.178

These types of savings inure primarily to the parties. However, the public can also benefit from efficiencies relating to individualized litigation procedures.179 For example,
[s]uppose A and B agree to a strict pleading rule that screens
frivolous suits. If the presence of frivolous suits in litigation
makes it more difficult for parties to settle meritorious suits,
as is likely, a strict pleading rule in a case between A and B
should make it easier for parties to settle and thereby save
the public cost of a trial.180

The possibility that private procedural contracts can result in
public savings may be particularly relevant in light of the
budget constraints currently facing the U.S. and other judicial
systems.181 Indeed, many courts are now under an explicit or
implicit duty to consider and encourage appropriate cost-saving
mechanisms.182
However, some caution must be exercised when considering
questions of efficiency because there is not always a direct correlation between public and private costs. In fact, some party-

178. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 526–27.
179. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1356–57.
180. Id. at 1356 (citations omitted).
181. See Federal Judiciary Braces for Broad Impact of Budget Sequestration, THIRD BRANCH NEWS (Mar. 12, 2013), http://news.uscourts.gov/federaljudiciary-braces-broad-impact-budget-sequestration.
182. See Neil Andrews, Relations Between the Court and the Parties in the
Managerial Age, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: RULE OF LAW
AND WORLD PEACE (Shimon Shetreet ed., forthcoming 2014); Máximo Langer
& Joseph W. Doherty, Managerial Judging Goes International, but Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY Reforms, 36
YALE J. INT’L L. 241, 242 n.2, 296–97 (2011); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 422–24 (1982); see also Glenn, supra note 21, at
490 (suggesting that managerial judging supports the concept of private procedural contracts).
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made rules that would initially appear to limit public costs
could have the opposite effect.183 For instance,
an agreement to limit discovery could increase public costs if
the expectation of a less onerous discovery burden and limited
access to information reduced the size of the settlement surplus and with it the likelihood of settlement, thereby increasing the risk of trial. Also, by restricting access to information,
discovery limits could generate trial or settlement outcomes
with a higher-than-optimal error risk, thereby undermining
deterrence goals. To be sure, parties will take account of private costs when they negotiate their contract, but there is no
reason for them to take account of public costs like these.184

However, “[i]t is extremely difficult to identify cases where
party rulemaking generates costs substantially in excess of
those already created by the current system.”185 Therefore, this
issue should not prove fatal to individualized procedures, at
least as a general matter.
c. Timing
The third structural concern that courts and commentators
should consider involves timing.186 Some commentators believe
that most examples of procedural individualization arise in the
context of pre-trial stipulations, which could suggest that parties are not able to create procedural contracts until the nature
of the dispute is known.187

183. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1357, 1374.
184. Id. at 1357 (citations omitted).
185. Id. at 1374 (citation omitted).
186. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 396; Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex Ante, supra note 30, at 1493–94; Paulson, supra note 25, at 491; see also RUTLEDGE,
supra note 85, at 184–89; Schultz, supra note 133, at 10–12; infra notes 390–
94 and accompanying text.
187. See Dodge, supra note 30, at 767; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 398–99;
Noyes, supra note 27, at 603; Paulson, supra note 25, at 514. This approach
may be the result of the presumption of flexibility, with the attendant opportunity for procedural individualization, inherent in certain aspects of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 29; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 396; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 6, 23, 65 (implying, rather than
stating, the possibility of procedural amendments); Hoffman, supra note 7, at
398–99. Parties may also agree to limit enforcement of a judgment to a particular jurisdiction or curtail the type of remedies that are available. See
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If true, this requirement could create some problems, since
past experience with forum selection clauses and international
commercial arbitration suggests that business entities may be
most likely to enter into individualized procedural contracts
before the dispute arises, when the “veil of ignorance” encourages parties to agree to mutually beneficial procedures free
from the kind of tactical constraints that arise once the conflict
has begun.188
To some extent, forum selection provisions and arbitration
agreements support the notion that procedural contracts may
be entered into on a pre-dispute basis, since forum selection
provisions and arbitration agreements involve more comprehensive procedural variations than would likely be the case
with private procedural contracts.189 However, forum selection
clauses and arbitration agreements could be distinguished from
customized procedural contracts on the grounds that the first
two types of agreements involve the withdrawal from a particular legal system rather than the alteration of that legal system’s procedural norms.
Although concerns about timing may arise in particular circumstances, there are examples of courts upholding the parties’
right to alter litigation procedures through contracts created
prior to the time of the dispute. Perhaps the most prominent of
these decisions comes from the U.S. Supreme Court, when it
upheld a cognovit note contained in a pre-dispute contract and
noted that the defendant “may not have been able to predict

Bone, supra note 30, at 1350; Dodge, supra note 30, at 727. Other procedural
alterations may also be possible. See Moffitt, supra note 13, at 467–78.
188. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 13–14; Hoffman, supra note 7, at
396–97 (identifying four types of dispute provisions and noting that most recent literature has focused on “Type 1” provisions, which involve pre-dispute,
arms-length bargains); see also RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 129, at 15–
18; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 129, pt. 1, ch. III, § 24; supra notes 131–33
and accompanying text. Some commentators find pre-dispute agreements to
be more jurisprudentially challenging than post-dispute agreements, although there is little discussion as to why that is so. See Hoffman, supra note
7, at 397.
189. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 134 S.Ct. 568, 579–80
(2013); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–97 (1991);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The Bremen), 407 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1972);
RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, at 182–89; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 398.

2014]

PROCEDURAL CHOICE OF LAW

1069

with accuracy just how or when [the plaintiff] would proceed
under the confession clause if further default by [the defendant] occurred, . . . but this inability does not in itself militate
against effective waiver” of the defendant’s procedural rights.190
Other judicial decisions can also be interpreted as supporting
pre-dispute agreements concerning procedural matters, as the
following discussion shows.
2.

Putting Theory into Practice

At this point, most of the commentary concerning individualized procedural contracts has focused on theoretical rather
than practical concerns, largely because of an alleged shortage
of case law considering private agreements relating to litigation procedure.191 This phenomenon is potentially problematic,
since courts are often more interested in practical applications
of particular principles than in theoretical analyses.192
This is not to say that theory and practice cannot be mutually
re-enforcing. Indeed, the recent case of Delaware Coalition for
Open Government v. Strine may be particularly helpful in this
regard.193 Although Strine does not discuss procedural contracts per se, both the District Court of Delaware and the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered a number of matters that are commonly associated with these types of agreements and demonstrate some of the analytical techniques discussed in the previous subsections.194
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. The dispute arose out of a constitutional challenge to a statute enacted
190. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972).
191. There is some debate on this issue. Compare Hoffman, supra note 7, at
393 (suggesting there is little case law in this field), with Noyes, supra note
27, at 599 (stating that “[c]ourts have enforced ex ante contracts that modify
a broad array of litigation rights and rules,” including those involving “constitutional rights, statutory rights, rights set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and rights set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence”).
192. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 140, at 693; Stapleton, supra note
140, at 533.
193. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del.
2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
194. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 510; Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 493. For a detailed discussion of the lower court decision and the propositions asserted in
the appeal, see Thomas J. Stipanowich, In Quest of the Arbitration Trifecta,
or Closed Door Litigation?: The Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 349, 357–60 (2013).
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by the Delaware legislature that attempted to create a judicially supported form of arbitration in the Delaware state courts.195
The law only contemplated arbitration of commercial matters
“by agreement or by stipulation” of the parties and with the
participation of all parties in the arbitral hearing.196
The procedure itself was largely innocuous. Arbitrations were
to be initiated through the filing of a petition that outlined “the
nature of the dispute, the claims made, and the remedies
sought,” and the arbitrator was to hold a preliminary conference within ten days of the initial filing.197 The preliminary
conference was to be followed by a preliminary hearing to identify “the claims of the case, damages, defenses asserted, legal
authorities to be relied upon, the scope of discovery, and the
timing, length, and evidence to be presented at the arbitration
hearing” as well as “the possibility of mediation or other nonadjudicative methods of dispute resolution.”198 The law also required the merits hearing to take place within ninety days of
the filing of the petition.199
The statute explicitly allowed the use of a number of procedures, including U.S.-style discovery, that are more common in
litigation than in arbitration.200 For example,
[p]rior to the arbitration hearing, the parties exchange “information necessary and appropriate for the parties to prepare for the arbitration hearing and to enable the Arbitrator
to understand the dispute.” The parties can agree to the scope
of information to be exchanged or can have the arbitrator decide the scope of discovery. Court of Chancery Rules 26
through 37, which govern depositions and discovery in all
Chancery Court matters, apply to the arbitration proceeding
195. The law was intended to “preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering
cost-effective options for resolving disputes, particularly those involving
commercial, corporate, and technology matters.” Del. H.B. No. 49, 145th Gen.
Assembl., at 4 (2009), as quoted in Strine, 733 F.3d at 512.
196. Strine, 733 F.3d at 512.
197. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
198. Id. (citation omitted).
199. See id. Although this type of expedited timeline is not unheard-of in
arbitration, it is unusual in litigation, even in Delaware, where court proceedings are considered relatively speedy. See William B. Chandler III & Anthony
A. Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery: A Response to Professors Carey and Shepherd’s “The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success,” 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 95, 127–28 (2009).
200. See Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
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unless the parties and arbitrator together agree to different
rules. Some discovery matters, such as the procedure for issuing subpoenas, must be created by the parties and the arbitrator.201

The importation of judicial rules of discovery is remarkable in
a proceeding that purports to establish a new form of arbitration, since one of the primary benefits of arbitration is the elimination (or at least the curtailment) of discovery.202 However,
the Delaware approach is less problematic if the proceeding is
characterized as a type of customized litigation, with judicial
rules of procedure existing as a default mechanism.203
The Delaware statute granted arbitrators broad but relatively standard powers, including “the power to issue a final award
and to make interim, interlocutory, or partial rulings during
the course of the proceeding.”204 The final award, which could
“be enforced as any other judgment or decree,” was required to
include the basis for the arbitrator’s decision.205 The statute
allowed arbitral awards to be stayed or vacated, but only in accordance with the terms set forth in the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).206
All of these elements passed judicial scrutiny.207 However,
some aspects of the Delaware statute were more problematic.
Three items—the confidentiality of the proceedings, the method by which the arbitrators were appointed, and the possible
infringement on mandatory judicial duties—give rise to particular concerns.
201. Id. (citations omitted).
202. Although arbitration often contemplates a limited exchange of documents, the scope of such disclosures is usually much narrower than in litigation. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1877–78, 1893–1905. Furthermore, it is
rare to see judicial rules on discovery explicitly imported into arbitration. See
id. at 1887, 1921; LEW ET AL., supra note 32, ¶ 21-11; STRONG, GUIDE, supra
note 32, at 77–78.
203. See supra notes 12–13, 121–24 and accompanying text.
204. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 495–96.
205. Id. at 496 (noting final awards should “include ‘any remedy or relief
that the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of any applicable agreement of the parties’”).
206. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2013); Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
207. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 522 (3d Cir. 2013)
(Fuentes, J., concurring) (“Nothing in [the] decision should be construed to
prevent sitting Judges of the Court of Chancery from engaging in arbitrations
without those confidentiality provisions.”).
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a. Confidentiality of the Proceedings
According to the Delaware legislature, the new form of statutory arbitration was to be “considered confidential and not of
public record until such time, if any, as the proceedings are the
subject of an appeal. In the case of an appeal, the record shall
be filed by the parties with the Supreme Court in accordance
with its rules.”208 This language provided the basis for the underlying legal challenge, which involved a number of journalists claiming that their First Amendment right of access to legal proceedings had been infringed upon as a result of the statute.209
Although both the district and circuit courts agreed that the
confidential nature of the Delaware proceedings invalidated
that aspect of the law,210 the requirement that procedures be
public rather than private does not create any real problems for
proponents of individualized procedural contracts. So long as
parties agree to have their dispute heard publicly, they can
avoid this particular obstacle.211 However, the debate about
confidentiality in Strine provides several insights into other
issues relating to private procedural contracts.
First, the majority opinion by Judge Sloviter reinforces the
notion that litigation and arbitration are very similar in terms
of functionality.212 Although the discussion was meant to iden208. 10 Del. C. § 349(b); see also Strine, 733 F.3d at 513. The scope of confidentiality was quite broad and encompassed “all parts of the proceeding, including all filings and all contacts between the arbitrator and any party.”
Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (quoting Del. Ch. Ct. R. 97(a)(4), 98(b)). “Only
parties [were] allowed to attend the arbitration hearing unless they agree[d]
otherwise,” and “[a]ll ‘memoranda and work product contained in the case
files of an Arbitrator’ and ‘[a]ny communication made in or in connection with
the arbitration that relates to the controversy being arbitrated’ [were] likewise confidential.” Id. (citations omitted). Although the statute required the
court to enter a judgment in conformity with the arbitrator’s final award, the
award itself was not to be made public, and details about the parties were not
to be included in the judgment. See id. at 496–97 (noting the judgments are
available on an electronic database under the title “arbitration judgments”).
209. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 521.
210. See id. at 513–21; Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502, 504. Judge Fuentes
noted that “[n]othing in [the] decision should be construed to prevent sitting
Judges of the Court of Chancery from engaging in arbitrations without those
confidentiality provisions.” Strine, 733 F.3d at 522 (Fuentes, J., concurring).
211. Some proceedings may still be heard “under seal.” FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2.
212. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 513–21; see supra note 160 and accompanying
text.
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tify any differences between judicial and arbitral actions so as
to determine whether the Delaware procedure must be open to
the public, the analysis instead demonstrated the numerous
ways in which litigation and arbitration overlap in terms of
purpose and procedure.213 This observation is not only important as a structural matter,214 it is also relevant to the substantive analyses that are conducted below.215
Second, several of the judges hearing this case suggested that
states may allow parties to adopt procedures that are very different from standard litigation, so long as the requisite consent
exists.216 While a number of the procedural elements in Strine
were initially devised by the state rather than by the parties
themselves, the Delaware arbitration scheme nevertheless required the parties’ consent to implement those procedures.217
Furthermore, the statute appeared to give the parties and the
arbitrators a great deal of discretion in adapting the procedure
by which the dispute was to be heard.218 Finally, there is no indication that the parties’ consent had to arise post-dispute,
which suggests that pre-dispute agreements regarding customized procedures are enforceable.219 As a result, Strine can be
read as providing structural support for individualized proce-

213. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 513–21.
214. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. For example, it could be
argued that any procedure that may be made subject to arbitration can also
be made subject to a private procedural contract, since the two procedures are
functional equivalents. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 391 (noting that “some
distinguished scholars now argue that parties’ greater ability to contract out
of federal and state procedural rules [through arbitration agreements] entails
the lesser power to modify them”); see also Michaels, supra note 160, at 342,
357 (discussing equivalence functionalism). While a full exploration of this
subject is beyond the scope of the current Article, the issue is nevertheless
intriguing.
215. See infra note 317 and accompanying text (suggesting the limits between litigation and arbitration are semi-permeable).
216. This principle is most clearly enunciated by Judge Fuentes in his concurrence and by the district court. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 522 (Fuentes, J.,
concurring); Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 495 (D.
Del. 2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551
(2014).
217. Strine, 733 F.3d at 512.
218. See Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
219. See supra notes 186–190, 390–394 and accompanying text.
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dural contracts, so long as the procedure is public220 and consensual.221
b. Appointment of Arbitrators
The second area of concern involves the means by which arbitrators are appointed under the Delaware statute. Although
neither the district court nor the circuit court discussed this
feature at length, the Delaware legislature indicated that proceedings were to be presided over by “a member of the Court of
Chancery, or such other person as may be authorized under
rules of the Court.”222
If the proceedings are to be considered as some form of arbitration, then this provision is highly problematic, since “virtually all authorities . . . accept that arbitration is a process by
which parties consensually submit a dispute to a nongovernmental decision-maker, selected by or for the parties.”223
Furthermore, the district court noted that while “[t]he Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, which creates court-annexed arbitration in the federal courts, seems to allow magistrate judges
to serve as arbitrators[,] . . . neither the parties nor [the] Court
could find evidence of that practice.”224 Of course, the appointment of a judge to hear the dispute is not at all problematic if
the proceedings constitute a form of customized litigation,
which is how the Delaware courts eventually framed the procedure.225
220. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 513–21.
221. Id. at 512.
222. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 494 (quoting 10 Del. C. §349(a)); see also
Strine, 733 F.3d at 512.
223. BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 217.
224. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502 (citing 28 U.S.C. §653(b) (2013)); see also
DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.3d
1163, 1165–66 (7th Cir. 1994); Brandt v. MIT Development Corp., 552 F.
Supp. 2d 304, 315 (D. Conn. 2008); Hameli v. Nazario, 930 F. Supp. 171, 182
(D. Del. 1996); Ovadiah v. New York Ass’n for New Americans, Nos. 95 Civ.
10523 (SS), 96 Civ. 330 (SS), 1997 WL 342411, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 23,
1997); Heenan v. Sobati, 96 Cal. App. 4th 995, 1000–03 (2002); Elliott & Ten
Eyck P’ship v. City of Long Beach, 57 Cal. App. 4th 495, 503–04 (1997);
Charles H. Smith, When Is an “Arbitration” Not an Arbitration? When a Sitting Judge Serves as a Private Arbitrator, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 29, 33 n.23
(2005); Stipanowich, supra note 194, at 359; infra notes 241–45 and accompanying text.
225. While some questions might arise as to whether the procedures permitted under the Delaware statute infringed upon the judge’s core adjudica-
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The Delaware statute also indicated that the arbitrator-judge
was to be appointed by the Chancellor of the Court rather than
by the parties.226 This element could appear to create difficulties at first glance because parties in arbitration are usually
entitled to choose their decision-maker themselves.227 However,
it is possible for parties to delegate selection of the arbitrator to
an arbitral institution or court, so this mechanism passes muster.228
c. Mandatory Judicial Duties
The third and perhaps most intriguing aspect of Strine involves the district court’s distinction between adjudicators who
are judges and adjudicators who are private citizens (i.e., arbitrators).229 According to the court, “[a] judge bears a special responsibility to serve the public interest. That obligation, and
the public role of that job, is undermined when a judge acts as
an arbitrator bound only by the parties’ agreement.”230 Furthermore, “the judge’s obligation in his public role as a judicial
officer” cannot be altered, even with the parties’ consent.231
This aspect of Strine is extremely useful, since it reinforces
theoretical notions regarding the sanctity of judges’ core adjudicative duties.232 Unfortunately, the court does not go on to
explain precisely what is encompassed within a judge’s “public
role as a judicial officer,” as opposed to the responsibilities of
“an arbitrator bound only by the parties’ agreement.”233 Comtive or public duties, those issues are less problematic if the procedure is approved by the legislature, since the state is generally considered competent to
define proper litigation procedures as a structural matter.
226. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 512.
227. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 217.
228. See id.; LEW ET AL., supra note 32, ¶¶ 16-11 to 16-29.
229. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 500. This issue has been addressed by commentators as well. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 217; RENÉ DAVID, ARBITRATION
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1985); EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE,
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
¶ 7 (1999).
230. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 502 (D. Del.
2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
231. Id. at 503.
232. For example, this aspect of Strine is reminiscent of discussion relating
to the core values of public adjudication and the distinction between matters
of public and private concern. See supra notes 149–64 and accompanying
text.
233. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 502–03.
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mentary provides scant assistance on this point, since there is
little scholarship comparing the nature of arbitration and litigation234 outside of some limited inquiries involving the differences between judges’ and arbitrators’ duties of independence
and impartiality235 and the ways in which judges and arbitrators can or should apply public policy.236
234. See LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:1, at
1–3 (2010) (noting arbitration coexists with litigation as “part of the American system of administering justice”); id. § 1:3, at 1-8 to 1-9 (indicating that
early precedent distinguished between commercial arbitration as a substitute
for litigation and labor arbitration as a substitute for avoiding industrial
strife, but suggesting that these distinctions may no longer apply); Cindy G.
Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 93–94 (2005) (noting differences
between arbitration and litigation); Pierre Mayer, Comparative Analysis of
Power of Arbitrators to Determine Procedures in Civil and Common Law Systems, in PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: THE LAW APPLICABLE
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, XII ICCA CONG. SER. (1994 Vienna) 24, 25–
26 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1996) (noting arbitration is sometimes considered “a substitute for State justice, albeit of a private nature, but nevertheless pursuing the same ends”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations
From Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 260 (2007) (noting “arbitration is a substitute for adjudication by litigation”); Jean R. Sternlight,
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1673
(2005) (concluding arbitration is not the same as litigation); S.I. Strong, Does
Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T
and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 241–45 (2012)
[hereinafter Strong, First Principles] (discussing the nature of arbitration);
see also Elliott & Ten Eyck P’ship v. City of Long Beach, 57 Cal. App. 4th 495,
503 (1997).
235. Although arbitrators are expected to behave in an independent, impartial, and (in the international context) neutral manner, arbitrators are not
always held to precisely the same standard as judges, since arbitrators are
expected to be part of the business world. Compare Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1968), with AT&T Corp.
v. Saudi Cable Co., [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Ct.
App.).
236. Some commentators believe that arbitrators are either more willing or
more able than judges to take the public policies of foreign states into account. See Stefan Michael Kröll, The “Arbitrability” of Disputes Arising from
Commercial Representation, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 317, ¶¶ 16-57 to 16-65 (Loukas A. Mistelis &
Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009). However, problems can arise if an arbitrator is too reliant on public policy, since arbitral tribunals are not empowered to act like common law courts. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 673–74 (2010); Strong, First Principles, supra note
234, at 240. This principle can be taken too far, however, since some courts
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Although Strine does not discuss the nature of judicial adjudication directly, careful reading of the two opinions nevertheless yields some useful information.237 For example, both the
district and circuit courts appeared to suggest that the procedural innovations proposed by the Delaware legislature did not
infringe on the judge’s public duties in any way, once the confidentiality provisions were struck.238 Thus, expedited timelines
and customized methods of taking and presenting evidence do
not appear to violate the judge’s “public role as a judicial officer.”239
This reading of Strine is consistent with a Seventh Circuit
decision concerning a purported attempt to have a federal magistrate preside over a private arbitration.240 In an opinion written by Judge Richard Posner, the Court concluded that “arbitration is not in the job description of a federal judge, including
. . . a magistrate judge. . . . Federal statutes authorizing arbitration . . . do not appear to authorize or envisage the appointment of judges or magistrate judges as arbitrators.”241 As a result, the magistrate judge would have been acting beyond his
judicial capacity if his actions were construed as arbitration.242
However, the Seventh Circuit did not stop there. Instead,
Judge Posner wrote that
[a]n alternative characterization to ultra vires of what the
magistrate judge did is possible. It is that the parties stipulated to an abbreviated, informal procedure for his deciding

have suggested that arbitrators not only have the ability but in some cases
the duty to consider the application of public policy and mandatory law. See
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
n.19 (1985); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1987) (indicating that public policy that can be ascertained by reference to the relevant law can and should be considered in
arbitral context, lest the award be rendered unenforceable); BORN, ICA, supra
note 3, at 2181; Strong, First Principles, supra note 234, at 240.
237. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 512 (3d Cir.
2013); Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 502–03.
238. See Strine, 733 F. 3d at 521–23 (Fuentes, J., concurring).
239. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d. at 503; see also id. at 495.
240. See DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp.,
14 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 1994); Stipanowich, supra note 194, at 366.
241. DDI Seamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1165.
242. Id. Framing a matter as “arbitration” carries several benefits, including a strictly limited form of judicial review rather than appeal on the merits.
See id. at 1166; see also Strong, First Principles, supra note 234, at 218.
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the case in his judicial capacity. Parties are free within broad
limits to agree on simplified procedures for the decision of
their case. They can agree for example to waive the right to
present oral testimony and instead to treat the summary
judgment proceeding as the trial on the merits. They can
agree that the hearing on a preliminary injunction shall be
deemed the trial on the merits as well. They can agree to a
trial on stipulated facts. They can, of course, agree to binding
arbitration, albeit before an arbitrator rather than a judge.
They can agree to waive appeal: that is possible even in criminal cases, by a plea agreement. One way to describe what the
parties and the judge did in this case is that they agreed that
the judge would make a decision on a record consisting of the
auditor’s report plus the parties’ objections, after oral argument by the parties conducted (as is increasingly common in
federal district courts) over the telephone, and that they
would not appeal the decision. So viewed, the procedure was
not improper. Of course the parties should have avoided reference to “arbitration,” a mode of dispute settlement distinct
from adjudication. They should simply have said that this was
the procedure they had agreed upon.243

Both the Third and the Seventh Circuits therefore appear to
agree that parties may contractually agree to amend standard
rules of procedure relating to a variety of issues, including discovery.244 This view is consistent with that taken by commentators who consider discovery to be one of the easiest practices to
regulate by private procedural contract.245
Not everyone agrees that matters relating to the taking and
presentation of evidence can be made subject to private procedural contracts. Indeed, some scholars have argued that limiting discovery can negatively affect certain core judicial duties.246 This claim appears to be based on the common law notion that judges need “to understand the whole case” before
making a decision, in contrast to civil law judges, who only
need to know “[w]hat evidence is required to reach a justifiable
decision.”247 However, it is not clear that broad, U.S.-style discovery and long, drawn-out trials can or should be considered a
243. DDI Seamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1166 (citations omitted).
244. See id.; Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
245. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1331; Dodge, supra note 30, at 745; Noyes,
supra note 27, at 609–10.
246. See Paulson, supra note 25, at 476, 511–15.
247. El Ahdab & Bouchenaki, supra note 15, at 72.
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necessary part of the adjudicative process. Indeed, there are
several reasons why that presumption does not appear to be
true as a matter of fact or theory.
First, the United States is exceptional, even within the common law world, in its approach to pre-trial discovery. Even
those jurisdictions that adopt a common law, “whole case” view
of judicial decision-making take a much narrower view of the
necessary scope of pre-trial disclosures.248 Furthermore, criminal procedure does not contemplate anywhere near the same
amount of discovery that is seen in the civil context, and no one
has ever claimed that criminal trials do not involve judges
working in a judicial capacity.249 Therefore, broad, U.S.-style
discovery does not appear necessary for a judge to carry out his
or her core adjudicative duties, even in the United States.
Second, U.S. practice strongly reflects the notion that the
taking of evidence is a quintessentially private activity.250 Not
only do federal and state rules of civil procedure place the responsibility for gathering evidence firmly within the hands of
the parties or their attorneys,251 but U.S. judges seldom ask for
particular evidence or witnesses to be introduced at trial, even
if the court is entitled to do so.252 Although U.S. practice differs
248. See LEW ET AL., supra note 32, ¶ 22-49; El Ahdab & Bouchenaki, supra
note 15, at 73; Strong, Discovery, supra note 74, at 510–11; S.I. Strong &
James J. Dries, Witness Statements Under the IBA Rules of Evidence: What to
Do About Hearsay?, 21 ARB. INT’L 301, 313 (2005).
249. See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and
Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 714–15 (2006).
250. See Strong, Consensual, supra note 30, at 160.
251. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Noyes, supra note 27, at 611; Paulson, supra
note 25, at 514 (discussing Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
Notably, the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place certain restrictions on the ability of the parties to shape their own procedure does not
preclude the possibility that autonomy exists in other regards. See id. (discussing Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Thus, for example,
the limitation on party autonomy in Rule 29 regarding the timing of certain
discovery-related activities does not necessarily bar other types of procedural
agreements relating to the taking of evidence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 29(b) (“[A]
stipulation extending the time for any form of discovery must have court approval if it would interfere with the time set for completing discovery, for
hearing a motion, or for trial.”). Instead, that provision simply reinforces the
notion that party autonomy cannot be exercised in a way that affects the relationship between the parties and the court.
252. See FED. R. EVID. 614, 706. The right to call fact witnesses is exercised
more often in the criminal context than in the civil context. See FED. R. EVID.
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from that of most civil law nations, where the taking of evidence is considered a public task,253 the U.S. approach is consistent with that of other common law countries.254
Third, judges in the United States do not second-guess the
parties’ tactical decisions regarding the presentation of evidence during trial.255 Although courts occasionally exercise
their inherent powers in matters relating to the presentation of
evidence, most acts of judicial intervention appear to focus on
curtailing abusive litigation practices rather than promoting
the court’s own views about what evidence should be presented
and how.256
Similar analyses can be conducted with respect to other types
of procedural agreements, such as those involving a “trial on
stipulated facts or on summary judgment rather than oral testimony”257 or those eliminating the opportunity for an appeal
on the merits.258 However, both the Seventh and Third Circuits
specifically stated that parties could enter into contracts concerning these procedures, which suggests that parties can
agree to limit or eliminate certain procedural practices (such as
oral testimony and cross-examination) that are typically conceived of as central to the common law legal tradition.259 In614 advisory committee’s note to subdivision (a). Courts seldom appoint their
own expert witnesses. See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee’s note;
Strong, Consensual, supra note 30, at 160.
253. See Hazard, Secrets, supra note 15, at 1682.
254. See Andrews, supra note 182 (discussing English practice). Indeed,
English courts have allowed parties to obtain evidence by means not otherwise known at English law. See ADRIAN BRIGGS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 38 (2d
ed. 2008).
255. See Strong, Consensual, supra note 30, at 160.
256. See FED. R. EVID. 614, 706 (noting the right of the court to question fact
and expert witnesses); Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent
Powers of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 46 (2008).
257. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del.
2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014);
see also DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14
F.3d 1163, 1165–66 (7th Cir. 1994).
258. See DDI Seamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1165; Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at
503.
259. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1786. Using “tradition” as a touchstone
for legal analysis is highly problematic. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Dumbo’s
Feather: An Examination and Critique of the Supreme Court’s Use, Misuse,
and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 923, 928–30 (2006).
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deed, U.S. courts appear to have long been capable of altering
common law rules, even those that are of a longstanding nature.260 Therefore, when considering what constitutes a core
adjudicative duty, courts and commentators must be careful
not to assume that a particular practice is central to the adjudicative function simply because it has traditionally been
available in U.S. litigation.261
C. Interim Conclusions
The preceding analysis suggests that although states may
have a legitimate interest in protecting the fundamental principles of institutional design inherent in their legal systems,
not every judicial procedure affects public, structural concerns.
Instead, some procedures arise solely between the parties and
therefore are entirely private as a matter of both theory and of
practice.
At this point, courts and commentators agree that parties
should not be able to alter matters touching on the administration and operation of the courts. However, there do not appear
to be any reasons to justify a prohibition on procedural contracts concerning matters that arise solely between the parties.
Furthermore, these types of procedural agreements can even
reflect certain positive virtues, including an increase in predictability in international commerce and a possible reduction
of certain public costs.
Although the preceding discussion paints a largely positive
view of procedural contracts in international litigation, some
courts may nevertheless resist party autonomy in procedural
matters, either because of concerns about perceived encroachments on judicial prerogatives or because of worries about what
constitutes a “proper” or adequate procedure. The first of these
260. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933) (“That this court
and the other federal courts, in this situation and by right of their own powers, may decline to enforce the ancient rule of the common law under conditions as they now exist, we think is not fairly open to doubt.”); DDI Seamless
Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1166; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–34
(2004) (allowing courts to tailor proceedings that did not fall within the mandatory core of constitutional due process); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11
Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2013 WL 5548913, *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2013) (requiring
parties to provide written witness statements instead of affirmative oral testimony in appropriate cases).
261. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1386–88.
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two matters should be dispensed with relatively easily, since
the United States Supreme Court has shown little patience for
judicial hostility to party autonomy, particularly in situations
involving international commerce. However, the second issue
could be problematic, since courts are duty-bound to protect the
parties’ fundamental procedural rights. These sorts of substantive concerns are taken up in the next section.
III. SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS ABOUT PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
The previous section suggested that courts and commentators
must look past surface considerations to determine whether
and to what extent a particular procedural practice affects core
structural concerns. This same kind of in-depth approach is
necessary when analyzing substantive concerns about private
procedural contracts in international commercial litigation.
However, rather than focusing on matters of institutional design, substantive analyses focus on questions relating to individual rights and the principles of due process and procedural
fairness.
Although it is critically important for courts and commentators to consider substantive concerns relating to procedural autonomy in international commercial litigation, the process can
involve some methodological difficulties. For example, it can be
challenging to even identify what the relevant substantive
norms are because due process and procedural fairness are typically considered as a matter of domestic rather than international or transnational law.262
Though daunting, the problem is not insurmountable, since
there may be another body of law that can help identify the due
process norms that apply in international commercial litigation. For example, international commercial arbitration is extremely well-developed in terms of its procedural norms and
has already been shown to have a structural connection with

262. The development of an international norm of due process is somewhat
more advanced in the criminal law context. See LARRY MAY, GLOBAL JUSTICE
AND DUE PROCESS 1–17 (2011) (suggesting domestic due process standards
should be extended to international law and recognized as jus cogens); Richard Volger, Due Process, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 929, 939, 945 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds.,
2012).
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international commercial litigation.263 Therefore, it may be that
there is a substantive link between the two processes as well.
That issue is considered in the following sections.
A. International Commercial Arbitration as a Framework for
Analysis
There are several reasons why international commercial arbitration might be able to provide an appropriate standard for
evaluating substantive concerns relating to procedural contracts in transnational litigation. First, as the discussion on
structural concerns demonstrated, numerous commentators
have identified a jurisprudential connection between procedural contracts in litigation and procedural contracts in arbitration.264 While the precise nature of that relationship has not yet
been defined,265 the fact that there is a structural connection
suggests the possible presence of a substantive affiliation as
well.266
263. See KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6; GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS,
PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶¶ 4.85–.94 (2004); S.I.
STRONG, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 71–137 (2009) [hereinafter STRONG,
RESEARCH] (providing bibliographic information).
264. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 17; Bone, supra note 30, at
1333; Dodge, supra note 30, at 781; Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 30, at
1106–07; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 428; Resnik, supra note 11, at 599.
265. Some commentators have suggested that “the analytical problems involved in opting out of litigation [and into arbitration] are quite distinct from
those arising inside the courtroom” while other scholars have taken the view
that “parties’ greater ability to contract out of federal and state procedural
rules entails the lesser power to modify it.” Hoffman, supra note 7, at 391,
395 (citations omitted).
266. One commentator has identified a number of procedural requirements
that apply in both litigation and arbitration. For example,
[j]udicial and arbitral decision-makers are required to render a
judgment or award, following representations from the parties. Six
fundamental principles are associated with this relationship between the adjudicator and the parties: (i) the adjudicator’s impartiality and (ii) independence; (iii), the adjudicator’s duty to treat the parties equally, (iv) to listen to both sides and to respect each party’s
right to controvert evidence or legal submission, and (v) the duty to
reach a reasoned decision within (vi) a reasonable time.
More generally, the numerous fundamental and important principles
of civil justice can be arranged under these five headings, which are
the five constellations of procedural principles: (1) advice and access:
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Some commentators would object to this methodology due to
a belief that arbitrators use different analytical techniques
than judges.267 For example, these commentators suggest that
arbitrators routinely disregard precedent and draft awards
that are bereft of any sort of legal reasoning.268 Setting aside
the question of whether those practices still arise in domestic
U.S. arbitration, it is clear that these allegations do not apply
in international matters.269
Instead, international commercial arbitration is universally
agreed to be a highly legalistic procedure involving extremely
detailed written and oral submissions outlining what are often
highly sophisticated legal arguments.270 Arbitral tribunals typically issue fully reasoned awards that explain the arbitrators’
substantive and procedural decisions in great detail.271 Many of
empowering the parties; (2) conditions for sound decision-making; (3)
an efficient process; (4) a fair process; and (5) upholding judgment.
Of these numerous principles, none can be regarded as detached
from the judicial process.
Andrews, supra note 182.
267. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1386–88; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 391,
395; see also supra notes 160–64 and accompanying text.
268. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1386–88. Bone also describes a somewhat
outmoded domestic U.S. practice (the non-neutral arbitrator) that does not
exist in the international realm, where independence, impartiality and neutrality are required. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1494–1507; Bone, supra
note 30, at 1387.
269. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 32, at 4–5.
270. See id.; Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69, 69, 73 (2003); Eric Bergsten, The
Americanization of International Arbitration, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 289, 294,
301 (2006); Born, Adjudication, supra note 10, at 877; Lucy Reed & Jonathan
Sutcliffe, The “Americanization” of International Arbitration?, 16 MEALEY’S
INT’L ARB. REP. 36 (2001); Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses
Its Grip: Are U.S. Lawyers to Blame?, 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 54 (2010).
271. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1871–72; Bone, supra note 30, at
1387–88. Indeed, some parties complain that arbitral awards are too long.
See Pierre Lalive, On the Reasoning of International Arbitral Awards, 1 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 55, 55 (2010). Although the style of the award may
vary depending on whether the decision-maker comes from a common law or
civil law background, arbitral tribunals are nevertheless acting in a judicial
manner. See S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration:
Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 119, 143 (2009) [hereinafter Strong, Sources]; see also supra note 247 and accompanying text (describing the different analytical approaches of civil law and common law lawyers).
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these awards are subsequently published in denatured (anonymized) form,272 which allows scholars to determine whether
and to what extent arbitrators comply with the law. Detailed
examination of these awards demonstrates a tradition of rigorous attention to legal argument and authority, similar to the
approach adopted by judges.273
Notably, the debate about due process in international commercial arbitration is not limited to principles enunciated in
arbitral awards and scholarly commentary. Instead, national
judges from around the world often consider questions of procedural fairness as a result of various types of ancillary litigation.274 As described further in the discussion below, the unique
nature of international commercial arbitration requires national courts and arbitral tribunals to adopt a highly consistent
set of due process standards that applies in both arbitral and
judicial contexts and in different countries. Furthermore, the
concept of procedural fairness in international commercial arbitration is developed through a highly iterative process that
involves both public and private adjudicators, although judges
necessarily have the final say about such issues. As a result,
discussions about the proper bounds of procedural autonomy in
international commercial arbitration appear highly relevant to
similar debates concerning international commercial litigation.
Support for the analytical methodology adopted in this Article can also be found in judicial decisions such as Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. Strine.275 Although that case
focused primarily on confidentiality concerns within the context of U.S. constitutional law, Judge Roth’s discussion of international commercial arbitration (rather than one of the various forms of domestic arbitration) supports this Article’s use of
international commercial arbitration as a guide to international norms of procedural fairness.276
272. See STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 263, at 45, 83–85.
273. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 9; LEW ET AL., supra note 32,
¶ 24-55; Bone, supra note 30, at 1388; Christoph A. Hafner, Professional Reasoning, Legal Cultures, and Arbitral Awards, 30 WORLD ENGLISHES 117, 117–
28 (2011) (describing differences between civil law and common law reasoning).
274. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 32, at 37–87 (discussing various ways
in which judges become involved in arbitration).
275. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013).
276. See Strine, 733 F.3d at 525 (Roth, J., dissenting).
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Another compelling reason to rely on international commercial arbitration involves the high degree of esteem with which
it is held in the business and legal worlds. Despite recent concerns about increasing formalism and costs,277 international
commercial arbitration is generally considered to be one of the
great success stories of the procedural realm.278 Not only are
the various conventions associated with international commercial arbitration among the most widely accepted treaties in the
world (indeed, the most successful of these, the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [more commonly known as the New York Convention] has been signed or ratified by 149 state parties),279 but
private parties typically prefer arbitration as a means of resolving their cross-border business disputes.280 Furthermore, the
widespread approval and perceived legitimacy of the procedures used in international commercial arbitration have led
numerous countries to adopt a treaty-based form of arbitration
(investor-state arbitration) that draws heavily on the procedural rules developed in the private commercial context.281
The amount of public and private support for international
commercial arbitration is impressive. However, what may be
even more important for purposes of this Article is the way in
which the norms associated with international commercial arbitration have become embedded in domestic law, either direct-

277. These concerns focus more on issues of cost than issues of procedural
irregularity. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 32.
279. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 217, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]; Status: Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), U.N. COMM’N ON
INT’L
TRADE
LAW
(UNCITRAL),
http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status
.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) [hereinafter New York Convention Status];
William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National
Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251,
257 (2008). Other treaties in this field are also well-recognized, although
those agreements are primarily regional in nature. See BORN, ICA, supra
note 3, at 91–109.
280. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 68–71.
281. See LUCY REED ET AL., Preface to the Second Edition of GUIDE TO ICSID
ARBITRATION, at xi (2nd ed. 2010); Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1272 (2009).
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ly282 or indirectly through the adoption of national legislation
based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Arbitration Law”).283 Although
commentators suggest that it is often difficult for international
legal norms to become incorporated into national law,284 the
process appears to have been very successful in the area of international commercial arbitration.285
Both the various conventions on international commercial
arbitration and the Model Arbitration Law reflect a high degree of respect for the parties’ procedural autonomy.286 However, parties cannot act with unfettered discretion. Instead, “procedural autonomy [in international commercial arbitration] is
qualified . . . by the mandatory requirements of applicable na-

282. This process is easier in monist states but also occurs in dualist regimes. See James A.R. Nafziger, Book Review: Dinah Shelton, ed., International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and
Persuasion, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 901, 902 (2013); S.I. Strong, Monism and Dualism in International Commercial Arbitration: Overcoming Barriers to Consistent Application of Principles of Public International Law, in BASIC
CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: MONISM AND DUALISM 547, 555–57,
563–68 (Marko Novaković ed., 2013).
283. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 18th Sess., Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/40/17
(June 21, 1985), revised by Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 39th
Sess., June 17–July 7, 2006, Annex I, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/61/17, U.N. GAOR,
61st Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2006) [hereinafter Model Arbitration Law]. The
Model Arbitration Law was designed to be consistent with the terms of the
New York Convention and thus with public international law relating to international commercial arbitration. See New York Convention, supra note
279; Model Arbitration Law, supra, Explanatory Note to 1985 version, paras.
47, 49; BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 115–21; William W. Park, The Specificity
of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 1243 (2003).
284. See René Provost, Judging in Splendid Isolation, 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
125, 153 (2008).
285. See Frédéric Bachand, Court Intervention in International Arbitration:
The Case for Compulsory Judicial Internationalism, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 83,
83; Zekoll, supra note 43, at 1348–51 (discussing “state-sanctioned party autonomy” in international commercial arbitration); see also EMMANUEL
GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 26 (2010) (suggesting international commercial arbitration is consistent with a theory of “strict
State positivism”).
286. See New York Convention, supra note 279; Model Arbitration Law,
supra note 283; BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 82–83, 91.
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tional law (subject to applicable international limits).”287 These
requirements are reflected in certain well-established norms
that are created and respected by both courts and arbitral tribunals.288
The jurisprudential connection between litigation and arbitration suggests that arbitration law may be able to provide
certain insights into the boundaries of procedural autonomy in
litigation. This is particularly true in the cross-border business
context, since the law relating to international commercial arbitration is far more developed than the law relating to international commercial litigation.289 Therefore, this Article analyzes the substantive concerns relating to procedural contracts
by using examples drawn from international commercial arbitration.

287. BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1749. One of the more salient discussions
regarding the difference between domestic and international principles of
public policy, including procedural public policy, is found in a series of reports
by the International Law Association concerning public policy as a bar to enforcement of international awards. See Int’l Law Assn. Comm. on Int’l Commercial Arb., Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards (2000), available at http://www.ilahq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19; Int’l Law Assn. Comm. On Int’l Commercial Arb., Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International
Arbitral
Awards
(2002),
available
at
http://www.ilahq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19; Strong, Due Process, supra note 98, at
67–70.
288. Arbitrators’ respect for international procedural norms exists not only
as a matter of informal acculturation but also as a result of what is often seen
as a duty to produce an enforceable award. See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 792–93; Günther J. Horvath, The Duty of the
Tribunal to Render an Enforceable Award, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 135, 135 (2001);
see also GAILLARD, supra note 285, at 53 (discussing the comparative and iterative elements of the transnational rules method). Arbitrators know that if
they exceed the limits of procedural fairness, their awards will be unenforceable, which is not the parties’ contracted-for outcome. See Horvath, supra, at
137–38. Hence, there is an implicit duty on the part of the arbitral tribunal to
conform with judicial norms of due process and procedural fairness. See id. at
145–48.
289. See infra notes 294–98 and accompanying text.
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B. Limits of Procedural Autonomy in International Commercial
Arbitration
1. Sources of Authority Describing Procedural Fairness in International Commercial Arbitration
When considering the limits of procedural autonomy in international commercial arbitration, it is useful to begin by
identifying the relevant legal authorities.290 Professor Matti
Kurkela and Santtu Turunen have suggested that a “prima facie order of sources . . . for identifying lex proceduralia or
transnational due process requirements in arbitration” includes
1) The New York Convention
2) Human rights conventions
3) International soft law concerning arbitration
4) Principles of law formulated from various national procedural laws.291

The first item on the list—the New York Convention—has
been characterized as “constitutional” in nature, an interpretation that has arisen at least in part because the New York
Convention plays a role comparable to that of a national constitution “in mediating between private autonomy (or liberty) and
governmental regulatory interests.”292 Although the New York
290. See KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10–11.
291. Id. at 11; see also New York Convention, supra note 279. “Lex proceduralia” can be described as a set of procedural norms that are analogous to
the substantive law known as lex mercatoria. See KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra
note 6, at 7–8. Extensive commentary exists regarding the content and historical development of the lex mercatoria, and it may be that some of these
principles would be equally applicable to the development of the lex proceduralia. See BERGER, supra note 6; Mary B. Ayad, Harmonization of Custom,
General Principles of Law and Islamic Law in Oil Concessions, 29 J. INT’L
ARB. 477, 488–90 (2012) (suggesting lex mercatoria fulfills the requirements
of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision
Making?, 17 ARB. INT’L 59, 59–72 (2001); Maniruzzaman, supra note 6, at
665; see also supra note 6.
292. Gary B. Born, Arbitration and the Freedom to Associate, 38 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 7, 22 (2009) [hereinafter Born, Associate]; see also New York Convention, supra note 279; Peter B. Rutledge, The Constitutional Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2009). This
constitutional function is also reflected in national laws of arbitration, which
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Convention does not discuss procedural autonomy directly, a
number of key principles can be derived from Article V, which
describes the grounds upon which an objection to recognition
and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award can be based.293
Article V is relatively general in nature (another characteristic that the New York Convention shares with many national
constitutions),294 but the principles are further interpreted and
applied in judicial decisions and arbitral awards that are reproduced in detail in various yearbooks and databases.295 Similar information has been gathered on judicial decisions construing the Model Arbitration Law, which was designed to be consistent with the terms of the New York Convention and which
has been adopted in whole or in part in nearly 100 jurisdictions, including a number of U.S. states.296
would include statutes based on the Model Arbitration Law. See generally
Model Arbitration Law, supra note 283; Born, Associate, supra, at 22.
293. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V; KURKELA &
TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10.
294. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V; Born, Associate, supra note 292, at 21. The content of the various due process provisions are
discussed in more detail below. See infra notes 330–53 and accompanying
text.
295. See UNCITRAL, Dissemination of Decisions Concerning UNCITRAL
Legal Texts and Uniform Interpretation of Such Texts: Note by Secretariat, ¶¶
8, 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/267 (Feb. 21, 1985); STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note
263, at 72–88; ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 2–3
(1981); Pieter Sanders, Foreword to INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, ICCA’S GUIDE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK
CONVENTION v, vi (2011); Barbara Steindl, The Arbitration Procedure—The
Development of Due Process Under the New York Convention, AUSTRIAN ARB.
Y.B. 255, 255–82 (2008). For example, UNCITRAL has compiled a database
known as CLOUT (Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts), which contains judicial
decisions from all over the world construing the Model Arbitration Law and
the New York Convention. See Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT),
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2014); see also New York Convention, supra note 279; Model Arbitration Law, supra note 283; STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 263, at 85–87 (discussing CLOUT). Other databases also exist. See 1958 NEW YORK
CONVENTION GUIDE, http://newyorkconvention1958.org (last visited Apr. 8,
2014).
296. See New York Convention, supra note 279; Model Arbitration Law,
supra note 283, Explanatory Note to 1985 version, paras. 47, 49; UNCITRAL,
Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(1985),
with
Amendments
as
Adopted
in
2006,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arb
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Compilations of national court decisions concerning international commercial arbitration have been collected for over fifty
years and provide an important insight into how judges interpret and apply mandatory principles of procedural law in the
cross-border commercial context.297 No similar collection exists
with respect to the limits of procedural autonomy in civil litigation.298
Kurkela and Turunen suggest that information regarding the
limits of procedural autonomy in international commercial arbitration can also be gleaned from “different kinds of soft law,
institutional rules, other international conventions, model
laws, human rights laws, and general procedural principles.”299
Indeed, some commentators believe that human rights instruments are more important than the New York Convention to
the question of procedural rights, since the synallagmatic character of the New York Convention gives it a lesser stature than
documents discussing universal human rights norms.300
Several international human rights instruments, including
the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(“Universal Declaration”), the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European
Convention”), apply to arbitration (albeit indirectly) and therefore could shed some light on questions relating to procedural
itration_status.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) (including adherents to both
versions of the Model Arbitration Law); BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 115–21;
STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 263, at 85–87 (discussing CLOUT); Park, supra note 283, at 1243.
297. See New York Convention, supra note 279; Model Arbitration Law,
supra note 283; STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 263, at 85–87; VAN DEN BERG,
supra note 295, 2–6; Sanders, supra note 295, at vi; Steindl, supra note 295,
at 255–82.
298. Some comparative studies exist relating to procedural rights in criminal matters, and some commentators have suggested that useful comparisons
can be made across the civil law-criminal law divide. See M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International
Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions,
3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 253–92 (1993); Sklansky & Yeazell, supra
note 249, at 684–85. However, no studies have actually applied this theory in
the international commercial context.
299. KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10; see also RUTLEDGE, supra
note 85, at 145–59.
300. See New York Convention, supra note 279; ALEKSANDAR JAKSIC,
ARBITRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 88, 221–25 (2002).

1092

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:3

autonomy.301 However, these instruments are somewhat different from the New York Convention in that they primarily address litigation rather than arbitration,302 thereby giving rise to
the question of whether it would not be preferable to establish
the limits of procedural autonomy in litigation by looking directly at these particular norms rather than proceeding indirectly through arbitration.
A direct approach would have some benefits, including the
ability to offset the argument that the New York Convention’s
limits on procedural autonomy only apply to proceedings meant
to recognize and enforce arbitral awards.303 However, primary
reliance on human rights instruments gives rise to a number of
301. See European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by Protocols
Nos. 11 and 14, art. 6, opened for signature Nov 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 14, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 23–28, 85–88; Schultz, supra note 133, at 8
(“[A]rbitration can only be permitted . . . if some mechanism exists that ensures that the national arbitration framework is in conformity with the
ECHR. Through such a mechanism, through its constraints on the national
arbitration framework, the ECHR applies indirectly to, or more generally has
a bearing on, arbitration.”). Some commentators dispute that conclusion. See
Adam Samuel, Arbitration, Alternative Dispute Resolution Generally and the
European Convention on Human Rights: An Anglo-Centric View, 21 J. INT’L
ARB. 413, 416–19, 426–27 (2004) (arguing that parties consenting to arbitration waive their rights under Article 6(1) of the ECHR); Schultz, supra note
133, at 7–8. A considerable amount of discussion has focused on the applicability of Article 6 of the European Convention to arbitration. See European
Convention, supra, art. 6; KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10; LEW ET
AL., supra note 32, ¶¶ 5-57 to 5-67; Vasil Marmazov & P.V. Pushkar, Is There
a Right to Fair Settlement of a Case by Means of Arbitration, as Guaranteed
by the European Convention on Human Rights?, 2 L. UKR. 52, 52–64 (2001),
available
at
http://eurolaw.org.ua/publications/ukrainian-journal-ofeuropean-studies/5-2011/42-is-there-a-right-to-fair-settlement-of-a-case-bymeans-of-arbitration-as-guaranteed-by-the-european-convention-on-humanrights.
302. See European Convention, supra note 301, art. 6; ICCPR, supra note
301, art. 14; Universal Declaration, supra note 301, art. 10; JAKSIC, supra
note 300, at 23–28.
303. See JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 77, 176, 88. Of course, this argument
can also be answered by the recognition that the due process norms applicable in international commercial arbitration reflect certain mandatory procedural principles that are consistent across national borders. See infra notes
338–42 and accompanying text.
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practical problems. First, a number of these instruments are
not directly applicable in domestic litigation304 or are only applicable in a limited number of legal systems.305 As a result,
these instruments provide little assistance in determining
whether and to what extent the various procedural principles
are broadly recognized or reflected in domestic law.306
Second, most treaty language is relatively general in nature.307 Although this is a problem shared by the New York
Convention, there are very few judicial decisions construing
human rights instruments’ procedural protections in the civil
litigation context. Those decisions that do exist are typically
rendered by international tribunals of limited jurisdiction rather than by national courts.308 Nowhere is there a global data304. See JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 108–09, 112; David Sloss, Legislating
Human Rights: The Case for Federal Legislation to Facilitate Domestic Judicial Application of International Human Rights Treaties, 35 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 445, 446, 449–51 (2012).
305. For example, the European Convention is not applicable outside Europe. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
OF
EUROPE,
Freedoms,
Status,
COUNCIL
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&D
F=&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
306. Some limited analyses exist in the context of criminal procedure. See
Bassiouni, supra note 298, at 292.
307. See European Convention, supra note 301, art. 6; ICCPR, supra note
301, art. 14; Universal Declaration, supra note 301, art. 10.
308. See New York Convention, supra note 279. Most litigation focuses on
the meaning of Article 6(1) of the European Convention, which has been cited
19,650 times by the European Court of Human Rights. See European Convention, supra note 301, art. 6(1); CASE LAW DATABASE, EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
(searching under “Article 6-1”) (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). However, the United States is not a state party to the European Convention, so the jurisprudence arising out of the European Court of Human Rights is not applicable in
the United States. See European Convention, supra note 301, art. 19; Council
of Europe, supra note 305. Furthermore, although many of the due process
provisions of the European Convention are the same or similar to other international instruments that have been signed by the United States (such as
the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR), it is unlikely that U.S. courts
would find the case law of the European Court of Human Rights persuasive.
See European Convention, supra note 301; ICCPR, supra note 301; Universal
Declaration, supra note 301; Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its
History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 260, 319–20 (2013) (discussing U.S. adherence to, including conditions attached to, the Universal
Declaration and the ICCPR); see also Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 86 (2005) (decrying use of foreign and inter-
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base or collection of cases relating to how these principles are
interpreted and applied by national courts in international
commercial disputes. Therefore, human rights instruments
provide useful insights into discussions relating to the limits of
procedural autonomy, but cannot compete with the depth or
breadth of analyses arising out of international commercial arbitration.
2. An International Customary Law of Procedure
Some commentators have described the extensive amount of
information relating to due process and procedural fairness in
international commercial arbitration as constituting a type of
lex specialis.309 While a lex specialis may be controlling in its
own field, those norms typically have little or no applicability
in other areas of law.310 However, experience in other contexts
suggests that it is possible for a lex specialis to grow beyond its
original scope of application and take on the attributes of customary international law or to “interpret the terms of another,
more general norm.”311 Furthermore, strict segregation of the
relevant legal principles may be inappropriate or impracticable
in cases where there is a particularly strong connection between two areas of law, as is the case between mandatory procedural norms in international commercial arbitration and international commercial litigation.312 Therefore, it appears possible to use judicial and arbitral authorities describing procedural limits in international commercial arbitration as a means
national law); Antonin Scalia, Commentary, International Judicial Tribunals
and the Courts of the Americas: A Comment with Emphasis on Human Rights
Laws, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1122 (1996) (same).
309. See New York Convention, supra note 279; Model Arbitration Law,
supra note 283; JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 387–89, 410–11 (2003); Bachand, supra note 285, at 84.
310. See PAUWELYN, supra note 309, at 387–89, 410–11.
311. Id. at 410–11; see also Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International
Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 611 (2007); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment
Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 129
(2003) ( “[T]he BIT movement has moved beyond lex specialis (or better, leges
speciales) to the level of customary law effective even for non-signatories.”);
Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 67, 114–15 (2005).
312. See supra notes 264–74 and accompanying text.
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of identifying a customary international law that also describes
the limits of procedural autonomy in international commercial
litigation.
The concept of a customary international law of procedure
appears to have been first proposed by Professor Thomas
Wälde when he suggested that various decisions of the European Court of Human Rights could be said to constitute a “customary international law of procedure.”313 In Wälde’s view,
principles relating to Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights should be considered to apply in investment arbitration by virtue of Article 52(1)(d) of the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention),314 which discusses
annulment of an investment award on the basis of a serious
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.315 Notably,
313. Thomas W. Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration
Under the Shadow of the Dual Role of the State; Asymmetries and Tribunals’
Duty to Ensure, Pro-actively, the Equality of Arms, 26 ARB. INT’L 3, 11 (2010);
see also European Convention, supra note 301, art. 6. Wälde’s point also raises the question of whether certain procedural practices should be considered
to constitute a form of jus cogens that is applicable in both arbitration and
litigation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679; JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 35–43;
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, INT’L LAW COMM’N STUDY GRP. ON FRAGMENTATION,
FRAGMENTATION
OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
§ 2.5.3,
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentation_outline.pdf; Anja Lindroos,
Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of
Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 27, 28–29 (2005); Wälde, supra, at 10–11.
At this point, the principle of jus cogens is still under development, and there
are those who would claim that jus cogens refers only to substantive rights.
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 510–12 (7th ed.
2008). However, other commentators have argued that certain procedural
norms can and should be included within the concept of jus cogens because
they arise as a matter of necessity to give effect to various substantive norms.
See Sévrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 NW. J.
INT’L HUM. RTS. 149, 29–30 (2011). Thus, the notion of a type of “procedural
jus cogens” is not outside the realm of possibility, although a discussion of
that point is beyond the scope of the current Article.
314. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States art. 52(1)(d), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; Wälde, supra note
313, at 10–11.
315. See ICSID Convention, supra note 314, art. 52(1)(d); LEW ET AL., supra
note 32, ¶ 28-104 (noting that the fundamental rules of procedure include
“rules of natural justice such as the right to be heard, equal treatment of the
parties and impartiality of the arbitrators”); Wälde, supra note 313, at 10–11.
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the concept of a serious departure from a fundamental or mandatory rule of procedure is also implicitly recognized in Article
V of the New York Convention.316
Wälde’s hypothesis that the boundaries between arbitration
and litigation are relatively fluid with respect to procedural
fairness is consistent with the perspective advanced in this Article and by other courts and commentators.317 However,
Wälde’s proposal began with judicial norms and moved to arbitration. The question is whether it is possible to make a similar
leap from arbitration to litigation.
Such a move appears possible pursuant to a three-step analysis. First is the recognition, as enunciated by Professor Ian
Brownlie, that “collections of municipal cases” are critical to
the “assessment of the customary law.”318 The various compilations of domestic court decisions relating to international commercial arbitration would appear to qualify as “collections of
municipal cases” within Brownlie’s meaning.319 This interpretation appears to apply even though the rights in question
arise initially as a matter of international law, since the various principles are incorporated into national law and, in some
cases, are even interpreted in light of domestic constitutional
norms.320
Second, to be recognized as customary international law, a
particular practice must be of sufficient duration, reflect a degree of uniformity and consistency, be of a general nature, and
be accepted as law.321 Although a detailed analysis of each of
these four elements is beyond the scope of the current Article,
the fundamental procedural norms recognized in the law relating to international commercial arbitration appear to meet
316. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V; see also infra notes
330–53 and accompanying text.
317. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 17; Schultz, supra note 133,
at 7–8 (discussing the 2001 decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Abel
Xavier v. UEFA).
318. BROWNLIE, supra note 313, at 52.
319. Id.; see also Bachand, supra note 285, at 84; Lowenfeld, supra note
311, at 129–30; Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 311, at 114–15.
320. See supra notes 282–85 and accompanying text (discussing domestic
application of international law). Although judges are supposed to interpret
the various instruments in light of international legal principles, courts will
sometimes consider core procedural protections in light of domestic constitutional norms. See Strong, Due Process, supra note 98, at 59–60.
321. See BROWNLIE, supra note 313, at 7–8.
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each of these requirements.322 For example, the procedural protections embodied in international commercial arbitration have
been recognized since 1959, when the New York Convention
came into force.323 While the international arbitral community
is continually striving to improve consistency of interpretation
in national courts,324 the various principles are currently construed in a relatively uniform manner and are recognized as
binding.325 Furthermore, the various norms are of a general
nature, as discussed in more detail below.326
322. See id. at 6–7 (discussing evidence of international custom); KURKELA
& TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10–11.
323. See New York Convention Status, supra note 279.
324. Although a number of these initiatives come from the private sector,
public bodies such as UNCITRAL have also tried to promote consistency in
the interpretation and application of various UNCITRAL texts on international commercial arbitration. Not only did UNCITRAL promulgate the Model Arbitration Law in order to increase the consistent application of the principles found in the New York Convention in jurisdictions around the world, it
also adopted a formal recommendation concerning the interpretation of the
form requirements found in the New York Convention and the application of
national law to matters relating to the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. See New York Convention, supra note 279, arts. II(2), VII(2); Model
Arbitration Law, supra note 283; UNCITRAL, Recommendation Regarding
the Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph 2, and Article VII, Paragraph 1, of
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, U.N. Doc. A/61/17; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex II (July 7,
2006); Park, supra note 283, at 1243; S.I. Strong, What Constitutes an
“Agreement in Writing” in International Commercial Arbitration? Conflicts
Between the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, 48 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 47, 51 (2012). Judicial training efforts, including those by the Federal Judicial Center, the International Council for Commercial Arbitration
(ICCA), and the Organization of American States (OAS), have also attempted
to make international commercial arbitration more consistent. See STRONG,
GUIDE, supra note 32; New York Convention Roadshow, ICCA,
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/NY_Convention_Roadshow.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2014); International Commercial Arbitration: Award Enforcement,
OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/international_commercial_arbitration.asp
(last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
325. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 5; S.I. Strong, Beyond the SelfExecution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty and Statutory Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 499,
525–27 (2013) [hereinafter Strong, Beyond] (discussing UNCITRAL studies
on international consistency in international commercial arbitration). Some
aspects of the New York Convention are directed specifically to national
courts themselves. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. II(3);
Strong, Beyond, supra, at 519–20.
326. See infra notes 330–53 and accompanying text.
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The third and final step requires norms that have been developed and recognized in the arbitral context to be transferred
to the judicial realm. This, of course, is the most controversial
aspect of this proposition. However, courts and commentators
have suggested that litigation and arbitration operate as functional equivalents at a structural level,327 which would suggest
that it would be appropriate to extend those analogies into the
substantive arena. Indeed, regardless of whether arbitration is
framed as a substitute for or alternative to judicial proceedings,328 individual parties would appear entitled to the same
core procedural protections.
Notably, the emphasis in this discussion is on certain fundamental norms, since it is well-established that parties in arbitration surrender some types of procedural protections that
would normally be available as a matter of domestic law.329
Since the propriety of this final step can be better analyzed in
context, the discussion continues with an analysis of the content of procedural fairness norms in international commercial
arbitration.
3. Content of Procedural Fairness Norms in International
Commercial Arbitration
Describing the content of the various norms of procedural
fairness in international commercial arbitration is a relatively
straightforward affair and begins with Article V of the New

327. See Michaels, supra note 160, at 342, 357 (describing equivalence functionalism); see also Schultz, supra note 133, at 2 (noting “awards are recognised as equivalents to judgments”).
328. See EDMONSON, supra note 234, § 1:1, at 1-3, § 1:3, at 1-8 to 1-9; Buys,
supra note 234, at 93–94; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 535–37; Mayer, supra note 234, at 26; Stempel, supra note 234, at 260; Sternlight, supra
note 234, at 1673; S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. §1782: Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 348–49 (2013) (framing arbitration as
a form of concurrent jurisdiction); Strong, First Principles, supra note 234, at
241–45.
329. See Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and Innovation: A Response to
Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271, 281–82 (2007) [hereinafter Reuben, Process] (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 31 (1991), and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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York Convention.330 That provision states in relevant regard
that
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused,
at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if
that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
...
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was
not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
...
(d) The . . . arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the
country where the arbitration took place. . . .
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also
be refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
...
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of that country.331

Thus, the New York Convention suggests that the procedure
chosen by the parties may not violate fundamental norms in330. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V. Article V also addresses the invalidity of the arbitration agreement or the incapacity of the
parties, see id. art. V(1)(a); matters not falling within the scope of the arbitration agreement, see id. art. V(1)(c); appointment of the arbitral tribunal, see
id. art. V(1)(d); awards that have not yet become binding or that have been
set aside, see id. art. V(1)(e); and the non-arbitrability of the subject matter of
the dispute, see id. art. V(2)(a). However, these matters are not procedural in
the same way that the issues described in Articles V(1)(b), V(1)(d), and
V(2)(b) are. See id. arts. V(1)(b), V(1)(d), and V(2)(b).
331. Id. art. V. The concepts reflected in Article V(1) “safeguard the parties
against private injustice,” whereas those found in Article V(2) “serve[] as an
explicit catchall for the enforcement of a country’s own vital interests.” Park
& Yanos, supra note 279, at 259. Sometimes matters of procedural fairness
are discussed under Article V(1) and sometimes they are elevated to Article
V(2)(b), which allows application of the public policy of the forum state, albeit
through an international lens. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art.
V; Strong, Due Process, supra note 98, at 59–60.
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volving proper notice, presentation of one’s case, or public policy.332 The Convention also recognizes that states may include
certain additional procedural safeguards in their arbitration
laws,333 although the parties may contract out of those provisions.334
These provisions have been construed on numerous occasions
by courts from around the world, and the decisions have been
collected in various databases and yearbooks.335 Scholars and
arbitrators have also played an active role in identifying the
boundaries of procedural fairness in arbitration.336 The depth
and breadth of case law, arbitral awards, and commentary in
this field prohibit a comprehensive independent analysis of the
underlying principles in the current Article.337 However, the
discussion does not need to be very detailed in order to make
the necessary points.
Commentators agree that the concept of due process in international arbitration “refers to a number of notions with varying
332. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V. Other aspects of arbitral law indicate that parties are entitled to a tribunal that is impartial,
independent, and neutral, although those principles are not specifically mentioned in the New York Convention. See id.; BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at
1494–1507; Andrews, supra note 182; see also supra notes 235, 266 and accompanying text.
333. Arbitration laws are not the same as rules of civil procedure. See
STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 32, at 14. National rules of civil procedure do not
apply in arbitration, unless the parties have an explicit agreement to that
effect. See InterCarbon Berm., Ltd. v. Caltex Trading & Transp. Corp., 146
F.R.D. 64, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
334. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V(1)(d). For example,
parties may contract out of the right to obtain judicial review of the merits of
an arbitral award under the English Arbitration Act 1996. See Arbitration
Act, 1996, c. 23, § 69 (Eng.).
335. See New York Convention, supra note 279, art. V; see also supra note
295 and accompanying text. National courts have also construed similar provisions under the Model Arbitration Law. See Model Arbitration Law, supra
note 283; see also supra note 295 and accompanying text.
336. Scholarly commentary holds a particular place of prestige in international commercial arbitration due to civil law influences and the private nature of the arbitral procedure. See Strong, Sources, supra note 271, at 150–51.
Arbitral awards are also an excellent source of information about the procedures used in arbitration. See id. at 142–43.
337. Entire books have been devoted to the subject of due process in international commercial arbitration. See KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6; see
also JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 227–44; PETROCHILOS, supra note 263,
¶¶ 4.85–4.94; see also Steindl, supra note 295, at 255–82.
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names under different national laws, including natural justice,
procedural fairness, the right or opportunity to be heard, the
so-called principle de la contradiction and equal treatment.”338
This principle “is often understood as a ‘hard’ rule of law, a
kind of a core or foundation of all other procedural rules, the
violation or disregard of which will lead to unenforceability of
the award or decision given.”339 “In many national laws this
core is described as ordre public or public policy.”340
These principles are considered fundamental or mandatory in
nature.341 Thus,
[t]he parties cannot . . . waive the irreducible core of procedural guarantees, such as the right to an independent and
impartial court, the right to a fair trial and the due process of
law which are sine qua non for liberty, dignity, justice and
primarily for the maintenance of the precedence of the rule of
law principle.342

The non-waivable nature of these concepts suggests that they
are as applicable in litigation as they are in arbitration.
Although the content of these norms is extremely consistent
at its core, the arbitral regime tolerates a certain amount of
diversity in how these principles are protected.343 Variations
arise as a result of the autonomy exercised by the parties in
their arbitration agreements and choice of institutional rules of
procedure, as well as through default provisions contained in
338. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1313, 1321 (2003) (citations omitted).
339. MATTI S. KURKELA & HANNES SNELLMAN, DUE PROCESS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2005).
340. Id. at 4.
341. However, it is not clear whether the rights are always constitutional in
nature. See id.; KURKELA & TURUNEN, supra note 6, at 10; Jane S. Schacter,
Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and
Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1203 (2009) (discussing subconstitutional nature of certain public policies); Stephen M. Schwebel & Susan G. Lahne, Public Policy and Arbitral Procedure, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION, VIII ICCA CONG. SER. (1986 New York) 205,
209 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1986) (discussing public policy’s constituent elements); James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner,
94 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1524 (2008) (noting public policy exceptions to enforcement of foreign judgments have at times been framed as subconstitutional in
nature).
342. JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 218.
343. See Schultz, supra note 133, at 9.
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the relevant national arbitration law.344 Arbitral tribunals also
retain a great deal of discretion to adopt procedures that are
tailored to the dispute at hand.345
Although international commercial arbitration permits a significant amount of procedural diversity, parties seldom operate
outside of certain relatively well-established parameters.346
Much of the procedural standardization in arbitration arises as
a result of the widespread use of institutional rules of procedure, which are similar in most regards and which harmonize
some of the key differences between common law and civil law
legal systems.347 Thus, international arbitral proceedings typically feature certain common law elements (such as crossexamination of witnesses, limited exchange of documents between the parties, and a single evidentiary hearing) as well as
various civil law features (such as the use of adverse inferences
and early submission of documentary evidence).348
Some commentators have suggested that international commercial arbitration differs from litigation because parties in
arbitration can select certain procedures, such as documentsonly or fast-track arbitration, that are not generally available
in court.349 However, judicial analogues can be found for most,
if not all, of these purportedly unique arbitral mechanisms. For
example, some jurisdictions have created “rocket dockets” that
simulate fast-track arbitration.350 Other courts allow litigation
to proceed on a documents-only basis if the parties consent to
such procedures.351 As a result, the differences between arbi344. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1785–94; LEW ET AL., supra note 32,
¶¶ 21-5 to 21-18.
345. See LEW ET AL., supra note 32, ¶¶ 21-12 to 21-13. Though potentially
broad, arbitral discretion is largely circumscribed in practice by party agreement as well as by the norms and principles described in various treatises,
rules, and arbitral awards, and therefore is not completely unbounded. See
STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 32, at 19.
346. See O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 9.
347. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1785–92; LEW ET AL., supra note 32,
¶¶ 21-33 to 21-39; O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 9.
348. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1785–92.
349. See id. at 1232 n.442; see also Schultz, supra note 133, at 6–7 (discussing expedited arbitration).
350. See Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil
Litigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225, 233–37 (1997).
351. See The Pennsylvania Tax Appeals Process and Suggested Reform, 8
PITT. TAX REV. 5, 10 (2010); Daniel F. Solomon, Summary of Administrative
Law Judge Responsibilities, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 475, 476,
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tration and litigation appear to be diminishing, at least in the
cross-border commercial context.
Furthermore, the literature suggests that most forms of procedural autonomy in arbitration do not result in a violation of
international due process norms, even when the parties have
agreed to limit the use of certain types of procedures typically
found in their home jurisdiction and adopt practices more routinely seen in other legal traditions.352 This phenomenon suggests that procedural fairness can exist even in the midst of
procedural diversity, a conclusion that is as relevant in international commercial litigation as in international commercial
arbitration.353
4. Comparison of Arbitral and Constitutional Standards of Due
Process
Some people might resist the notion that due process norms
can be transferred from arbitration to litigation because arbitration is considered to constitute a form of “rough justice” that
grants only minimal due process protections.354 However, the
idea that arbitration reflects a type of mandatory procedural
minimum works to the benefit of the current analysis, since
that principle can also be used to describe the outer bounds of
procedural autonomy. The relevance of arbitral due process
minimums to litigation is even more apparent given that the
501 (2011) (discussing how parties in administrative disputes can waive their
right to a hearing); see also Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691
(LAK), 2013 WL 5548913, *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2013) (using witness statements instead of affirmative oral testimony, which is more often seen in international commercial arbitration than in litigation); CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37, § 7.4 (waiving oral argument in many types
of motion practice).
352. See supra notes 347–48 and accompanying text.
353. The same conclusions could be drawn from decisions relating to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, which also look to broad
principles of procedural fairness rather than similarities of particular procedural practices. See Strong, Judgments, supra note 14. However, analyses of
these decisions can be extremely difficult because courts are considering more
than procedural fairness. See id. (noting the role that reciprocity, public policy, and other issues play in decisions relating to foreign judgments). The relatively limited nature of procedural review in arbitration makes the analysis
easier and more transparent. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 2739.
354. See Reuben, Process, supra note 329, at 281–82 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991), and Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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core, non-derogable norms that are considered to form a “‘hard’
rule of law” in international commercial arbitration bear a
striking resemblance to certain basic constitutional principles
of procedural fairness. 355
Domestic standards of constitutional due process356 have traditionally been considered inapplicable to arbitration because
arbitration does not constitute state action per se.357 Nevertheless, Professor Peter Rutledge has suggested that “constitutional principles have seeped into arbitration through other
mechanisms,” thereby establishing a de facto need for arbitration to comply with U.S. law regarding procedural due process.358 This “seepage” occurs through a variety of means, including public policy provisions in various international treaties and national laws concerning international commercial arbitration.359
Professor Richard Reuben has also identified a connection between U.S. constitutional law and arbitration based on a theory
of shared state action.360 Although arbitration is technically a
private form of dispute resolution, Reuben sees courts as becoming increasingly involved in overseeing, facilitating, and
enforcing arbitration agreements.361 Reuben believes this pub-

355. KURKELA & SNELLMAN, supra note 339, at 1.
356. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334
(1976) (stating “‘(d)ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances” and
noting that “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands” (citations omitted)); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process,
25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8–9 (2006). The discussion here will focus on U.S.
law, although a comparative analysis of different jurisdictions would eventually be useful.
357. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, at 144–45. The one exception to this
general proviso is court-annexed arbitration, which clearly constitutes state
action. See id. at 131; see also Amy J. Schmitz, Nonconsensual + Nonbinding
= Nonsensical? Reconsidering Court-Connected Arbitration Programs, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 587, 603–06 (2009).
358. RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, at 145–59.
359. Id.
360. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949,
956–58 (2000).
361. See id.
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lic element is enough to trigger a duty to apply constitutional
standards of procedural fairness in arbitration.362
These commentators’ views have some notable support from
Lord Neuberger, President of the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom, who recently stated that arbitrators have “a duty to
act judicially” because they “are participating in the rule of
law” when they are deciding cases.363 Interestingly, this obligation is owed not only “to the parties to the arbitration, but . . .
also . . . to the public.”364 While this principle has obvious structural implications,365 it also carries important substantive ramifications, since it suggests that procedural practices in arbitration cannot drop below the minimum necessary for the rule of
law.366
Regardless of whether one believes that constitutional principles must, or simply, may be applied in arbitration, it is nevertheless possible to consider whether and to what extent arbitral standards of due process are currently consistent with U.S.
constitutional norms. For example, basic procedural norms in
arbitration focus primarily on the opportunity to be heard
(which includes notice), equality of arms, and use of an impartial adjudicator.367 Interestingly, Professor Niki Kuckes has argued that
the essential element of procedural due process [in the United
States], as clearly established in civil settings, is that notice
and a hearing must ordinarily precede any governmental dep362. See id.
363. Lord Neuberger, Address to Property Arbitrators at the ARBRIX Annual
Conference,
London
(Nov.
12,
2013),
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech-131112.pdf.
364. Id.
365. For example, Lord Neuberger takes the view that arbitrators “are giving effect to the parties’ contract in accordance with substantive and procedural legal principles,” which contradicts assertions by certain commentators
that arbitrators do not interpret and apply legal precedent. Id.; see also Bone,
supra note 30, at 1386–88; supra notes 360–64 and accompanying text.
366. See Andrews, supra note 182; Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the
Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2008) (discussing procedural aspects of the
rule of law); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing four conceptions of the rule of law); supra note 266.
367. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 338, at 1321–22; Strong, Due Process, supra note 98, at 53–75; Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The
Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1711, 1770 (2006).
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rivation of a liberty or property interest. . . . [I]t is useful to
refer to the notice-and-hearing model as a “civil” model of due
process because it is in civil settings that this test is clearly
established as the single constitutional approach to procedural due process.368

This description not only provides a useful retrospective
analysis of how U.S. courts have behaved in the past, it also
suggests how courts might act in the future. For example,
[w]hen a majority of Justices in Hamdi agreed on the core requirements of procedural due process, . . . they applied a classic civil formulation—the right to notice and an opportunity to
be heard before an impartial adjudicator—as the correct constitutional approach to due process even for the executive detention of enemy combatants, a new and controversial civil
setting.369

Hamdi therefore suggests that this basic standard of procedural fairness in civil litigation will be adopted in other types of
novel circumstances, including, it is assumed, in cases involving individualized procedural contracts.370 Hamdi also demonstrates a certain amount of consistency between judicial and
arbitral standards relating to procedural due process, thereby
suggesting that the corpus of authority concerning procedural
fairness in international commercial arbitration may be relied
upon to define procedural fairness in international commercial
litigation.371
However, Hamdi is lacking in one notable regard.372 Although arbitral standards of procedural fairness require equality of arms between the parties, Hamdi makes no mention of
that particular principle.373 This omission may simply be due to
368. Kuckes, supra note 356, at 8–9 (footnotes omitted). Although notice
appears to be a core element of due process in both litigation and arbitration,
some authorities have suggested that parties may alter the means by which
notice is given or even waive notice altogether. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd.
v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen,
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 351 (1996) (discussing
cognovit notes).
369. Kuckes, supra note 356, at 8–9 (footnotes omitted) (discussing Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)).
370. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. See id.
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the fact that Hamdi was more concerned with constitutional
notions of procedural due process rather than equal protection
per se.374 However, this lacuna may also be attributed to the
fact that the concept of “equality of arms” is better developed in
international jurisprudence than in domestic U.S. case law.375
The international understanding of “equality of arms” is not
precisely synonymous with equal protection under the U.S.
Constitution.376 For example, the notion of “equality of arms”
involves “the fundamental principle that a party should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present its case in conditions that do not place it at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis
its adversary.”377 While U.S. equal protection analyses incorporate some of these principles, the primary emphasis in U.S. civil litigation is on ensuring access to the courts378 rather than on
addressing the kinds of procedural disadvantages that can
arise when parties come from different legal systems.379 Focusing on access makes sense in a domestic system where a transsubstantive and purportedly uniform code of procedure is assumed to assuage most, if not all, outcome-determinative disparities that could arise between parties.380 However, cross374. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; Scott W. Howe,
The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure:
From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 384 &
n.128 (2001).
375. See Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to
Counsel: Lessons from Domestic and International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260,
2264–65 (2013).
376. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
377. Davis, supra note 375, at 2264–65.
378. See Helen Hershkoff, Poverty Law and Civil Procedure: Rethinking the
First-Year Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1326, 1332–33 (2007). Many of these actions have been unavailing, even in cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
Hershkoff, supra, at 1332–33. Equal protection claims also involve group
identity, although some commentators have suggested that those injuries
have “migrated” to the realm of due process. See Joseph Blocher, Rights To
and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 806 (2012).
379. For example, a number of procedural advantages can arise as a result
of differences relating to the taking of evidence, preparation of witnesses, and
evidentiary privileges. See, e.g., Berger, Privileges, supra note 16, at 517–18
(discussing evidentiary privileges); Strong & Dries, supra note 248, at 311–12
(discussing the presentation of evidence); Wälde, supra note 313, at 17–36
(discussing cases involving state parties).
380. See Marcus, Past, supra note 76, at 374, 376–80 (discussing purposes
of trans-substantivity and disconnect with uniformity).
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border litigants experience different sorts of issues, and, as
parties in international commercial arbitration have found, a
more flexible approach may be necessary to address various
substantive and structural imbalances that arise.381 Indeed,
“[a]s transnational litigation continues to become the bread and
butter for more and more lawyers, the absolute insistence on
the application of the procedural law of the forum seems less
and less justified without some form of a more complete choice
of law analysis.”382
Further discussion of the substantive validity of any particular procedural practice is beyond the scope of the current Article, since due process analyses cannot be conducted in the abstract.383 However, courts appear entirely capable of addressing
any concerns that might arise, either through contract-based
challenges (such as those based on unconscionability)384 or via
the inherent power of the court.385 Indeed, the process by which
such rulings can be made is even easier in litigation than in

381. See, e.g., Berger, Privileges, supra note 16, at 517–18; Strong & Dries,
supra note 248, at 311–12; Wälde, supra note 313, at 17–36.
382. Anton, supra note 87, at 489; see also BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at
1 (suggesting procedure can have an effect on the outcome of a dispute).
383. See JAKSIC, supra note 300, at 227 (“[T]he right to a fair hearing represents an independent procedural guarantee whose contents are open and is to
be determined in each particular case.”); see also id. at 230 (“[I]t is unlikely to
expect that one could evaluate in abstracto the compliance of the arbitral
process as a whole with the requirements of the right to a fair trial as laid
down in Articles 6(1) of the EHRC and 14(1) of the Political Covenant respectively.”). Future analyses might consider the concept of procedural fairness
from a socio-psychological perspective. See Nancy A. Welsh et al., Why Theory
Matters in Investor-State Dispute Resolution Processes, 42 WA. U. J.L. & POL’Y
(forthcoming 2014).
384. This approach has been effective in eliminating procedural unfairness
in domestic arbitration. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct.
1740, 1746 (2011); Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772,
2780–81 (2010). For example, it has been suggested that the concept of equality in litigation might be so fundamental that it cannot be contracted around
as a matter of public policy. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 291,
249–50 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
385. See Matter of Dunleavy, 769 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1988) (noting inherent judicial powers include the “power to take actions reasonably necessary to administer justice efficiently, fairly, and economically”); Anclien, supra note 256, at 43.
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arbitration, since the court has both initial and continuing jurisdiction over the parties.386
C. Interim Conclusions
The preceding section has explored the idea that international commercial arbitration can provide an appropriate and useful means of identifying the substantive limits of procedural
autonomy in international commercial litigation. This hypothesis is based not only on the functional similarities between arbitration and litigation, but also on the fact that international
commercial arbitration has a well-developed body of law describing certain mandatory procedural minimums from which
the parties may not derogate. Since parties may not contract
around these norms in arbitration, it is logical to conclude that
parties in litigation would also be prohibited from altering these procedures.
The transferability of arbitral norms to litigation is also supported by a content-based analysis. Although the standards described herein are relatively general in nature, arbitral standards of due process appear very similar to domestic principles
of constitutional due process. While it will eventually be necessary to conduct a more extensive analysis of other nations’ fundamental procedural norms, one would expect the research to
show a relatively high degree of consistency between the outer
bounds of procedural autonomy in international commercial
arbitration and the limits of autonomy in national and international litigation, since the standards that have been developed
in international commercial arbitration have been generated by
long-term comparative analyses of domestic and international
law.
IV. LOGISTICAL CONCERNS
Although parties will need to consider carefully whether and
to what extent a particular procedural practice is amenable to
customization before entering into an agreement involving that
issue, this Article takes the view that, generally speaking, procedural contracts are possible in international commercial dis386. Concerns about procedural fairness can arise at the beginning or end of
an arbitration and can be heard by either a court or an arbitral tribunal, although courts always have the final say on such matters. See STRONG, GUIDE,
supra note 32, at 37–41, 65–66, 73–85.
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putes as both a structural and substantive matter. This conclusion should increase the number of procedural contracts that
appear in practice, since some of the uncertainty about the enforceability of such contracts has now been eliminated.
However, the fact that procedural contracts appear enforceable as a general matter does not mean that parties should start
drafting those sorts of provisions without any further concerns.
Instead, parties need to consider a number of logistical issues
before entering into an agreement purporting to alter the procedures used in a particular court.
A. Standalone Versus Embedded Agreements
Experience with arbitration agreements and forum selection
clauses suggests that procedural agreements can either be incorporated into a larger transactional document or memorialized independently.387 To some extent, parties’ preference for a
particular type of contract may be driven by various external
factors, such as when the agreement is made.388
However, one issue that may arise in cases of embedded provisions is whether the procedural agreement survives allegations that the contract in which the procedural provision is
found is invalid, illegal, void, or voidable. Such claims have not
proven unduly problematic in situations involving forum selection clauses or arbitration agreements, but this is a matter that
may need to be considered with respect to private procedural
contracts.389
B. Pre-Dispute Versus Post-Dispute Agreements
Experience with arbitration agreements and forum selection
clauses suggests that parties may be most likely to enter into a
procedural agreement before the dispute arises, since tactical
considerations (either real or perceived) may preclude an
387. See COCA, supra note 22, art. 3(d); BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at
37.
388. See infra notes 390–94 and accompanying text.
389. For example, the arbitral principle of separability ensures the continuing validity of an embedded arbitration agreement even if the larger contract
is said to be invalid, illegal, or terminated. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2,
at 136. While this principle is likely applied to forum selection provisions as
well, there is far less authority on that point. See id. However, COCA will
resolve some of these issues once that instrument comes into force. See
COCA, supra note 22, art. 3(d); see also supra note 22.
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agreement on procedural matters once hostilities have begun.390 However, pre-dispute agreements may not be suitable
in all circumstances, either because the parties do not have a
pre-existing contractual relationship or because of policy concerns about waiving or amending certain procedural rights prior to the time the dispute arises.391
A full analysis of potential policy issues is beyond the scope of
the current Article. However, future inquiries might focus on
the adequacy of information at the time of contracting and inequalities in bargaining power.392 A number of these matters
have been considered in the arbitral context,393 and it is likely
that courts will consider procedural contracts in a similar
light.394
C. Customized Clauses Versus Model Agreements
Parties seeking to draft a private procedural agreement must
also decide whether to create their own customized clause or
rely on model language found elsewhere. Here, previous practice provides no clear guidance. For example, arbitration

390. See Bone, supra note 30, at 1349; see also BORN, DRAFTING, supra note
2, at 37.
391. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, at 184–89; Davis & Hershkoff, supra
note 11, at 527–29; Dodge, supra note 30, at 766; Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex
Ante, supra note 30, at 1493–94 (noting public and private implications of
timing decisions); see supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text.
392. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 527–29; Kapeliuk & Klement,
Ex Ante, supra note 30, at 1493–94. Although many scholars focus on whether pre-dispute waivers are appropriate in situations where there is incomplete information, attention must also be paid to the possibility that postdispute waivers could be deemed invalid as the result of judicial pressure. See
Heenan v. Sobati, 96 Cal. App. 4th 995, 1003 n.5 (2002).
393. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 85, at 184–89. For example, some countries
do not permit consumers to enter into pre-dispute arbitration agreements
because of concerns about imbalances of power. See Council Directive
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J.
(L 95) 29; JONATHAN HILL, CROSS-BORDER CONSUMER CONTRACTS 206–07, 215
(2008); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; A Market
Incentive Solution to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in Online Consumer Arbitration, 23
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 56 (2002).
394. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 391, 412–13 (noting arbitration and litigation exhibit analytical similarities as well as dissimilarities). But see Kapeliuk & Klement, Ex Ante, supra note 30, at 1493–94 (discussing public implications).
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agreements are typically based on well-known model clauses,
since those provisions have been tested over time and are less
likely to be found ambiguous or invalid.395 In contrast, forum
selection clauses are more likely to be drafted on an individual,
case-by-case basis, although standard language also exists in
this context.396
To some extent, the decision of whether to use a customized
clause versus a model agreement may depend on the complexity of the procedure at issue. While it may seem counterintuitive
to use a model agreement in more intricate situations, increased complexity often results in an increased opportunity for
error.397 Therefore, parties may be better served by using a preexisting model if they intend to alter a large number of procedural practices.
The choice between customized and model language may also
depend on the amount of institutional support for a particular
process. The widespread popularity of international commercial
arbitration has led to the proliferation of model arbitration
agreements drafted by arbitral organizations.398 Parties therefore have a number of different models from which to choose.399
Even though the same amount of institutional support does not
yet exist for private procedural contracts, parties seeking guidance in the drafting process can nevertheless consult several
different sources for ideas regarding useful language.400
1. CPR Model Civil Litigation Prenup
Parties seeking assistance in drafting a private procedural
contract might begin by looking at the CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, more commonly referred to as the CPR Model
Civil Litigation Prenup.401 Although this agreement is extremely detailed, the focus is primarily on discovery issues, which
has the happy consequence of avoiding many of the concerns
relating to the core adjudicative duties of the court or possible
interference with the relationship between the court and the
395. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 37–38; RUTLEDGE, supra note 85,
at 200.
396. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 36.
397. See id. at 38.
398. See id. at 37–38.
399. See id.
400. See Noyes, supra note 27, at 640–45 (listing various alternatives).
401. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37.
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parties.402 The agreement is specifically tailored to commercial
disputes and includes various provisions that are sensitive to
the particular demands of cross-border litigation, even though
the agreement appears to contemplate a U.S. forum.403
The Model Civil Litigation Prenup has not yet been judicially
considered, despite the respect with which CPR is held in the
legal world and the relatively limited scope of the agreement
suggest that courts may be inclined to uphold the provision.404
Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that the discovery process includes some public elements, and it is possible
that some courts may also adopt that perspective.405
CPR suggests that parties adopt the Model Civil Litigation
Prenup by inserting certain standard language in their transactional document.406 The provision may be amended by the
parties, although such revisions should be made with caution,
since they run the risk of creating an ambiguous or otherwise
pathological clause.407 CPR has attempted to avoid any questions about the separability of the Model Civil Litigation
Prenup from the underlying contract by including language
specifically indicating that the procedural agreement will survive claims relating to “the breach, termination or validity” of
the substantive contract.408

402. See id. §§ 9–12; see supra note 245 and accompanying text (noting discovery is perhaps the easiest procedure to alter). However, some problems
could arise with respect to the timing of certain submissions, since some
commentators have suggested that amendment of court dates could impermissibly infringe on the judge’s role. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37, § 5; Paulson, supra note 25, at 476.
403. The agreement’s discussion of jury waivers, depositions, and the work
product doctrine all suggest a U.S.-centric perspective, since those are all
quintessential U.S. concerns. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement,
supra note 37, §§ 2, 11, 12.2.5. However, references to foreign privacy laws
demonstrate a sensitivity to non-U.S. legal principles. See id. § 12.2.5 (discussing the European Union’s Data Protection Directive).
404. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37.
405. See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.
406. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37.
407. See id.; BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 38.
408. CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37; see also BORN,
ICA, supra note 3, at 353–54 (discussing separability in the arbitral context).
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2. The ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure
As useful as the CPR Model Civil Litigation Prenup may be,
it is largely limited to discovery concerns.409 Parties seeking a
more comprehensive procedural agreement may find inspiration in the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil
Procedure or the affiliated Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, which were compiled by the Reporters as a means of
“providing greater detail and illustrating concrete fulfillment of
the Principles.”410 Although no U.S. court appears to have considered either the Principles or the Rules in an actual litigation, the respect with which the ALI and UNDROIT are held
worldwide might increase the likelihood that a court will enforce a procedural agreement based on the Principles or
Rules.411
The ALI/UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational
Civil Procedure were specifically designed for use in international commercial disputes, which may make this framework
particularly attractive to parties involved in cross-border
transactions.412 Potential litigants may also be drawn to the
ALI and UNIDROIT approach because of its respect for the
various substantive concerns discussed in this Article.413
As a general matter, the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of
Transnational Civil Procedure do an excellent job in protecting
the core elements of procedural fairness discussed in this Article.414 Thus, the parties’ ability to present their case is guaranteed by provisions requiring “notice . . . by means that are reasonably likely to be effective” as well as language protecting
“the right to submit relevant contentions of fact and law and to
offer supporting evidence” and the ability to “have a fair oppor409. See CPR Economical Litigation Agreement, supra note 37.
410. ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 99. The Rules are meant “to be
interpreted in accordance with the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure and applied with consideration of the transnational nature of the dispute,” thereby creating an “autonomous mode of interpretation, consistent
with the principles and concepts by which they are guided.” ALI &
UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 100.
411. See id. at xiii–xxii (listing reporters, advisers, and members of the various working and consultative groups); Glenn, supra note 21, at 490–91.
412. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 16.
413. See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.
414. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 20–24, 41.
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tunity and reasonably adequate time to respond to contentions
of fact and law and to evidence presented by another party, and
to orders and suggestions made by the court.”415 Equality of
arms is similarly protected by language requiring “equal
treatment and reasonable opportunity for litigants to assert or
defend their rights” and the “avoidance of any kind of illegitimate discrimination, particularly on the basis of nationality or
residence.”416 Proceedings are also open to the public, except for
good cause.417
However, some problems do exist. For example, the Principles are somewhat general, and it may be difficult for parties
and courts to put the various concepts into practice.418 Although the Rules were meant to provide more detail so as to allow parties to implement the Principles, the Rules were not
meant to be comprehensive in nature, and some confusion may
arise as to which procedures apply in any given situation.419
Other issues may arise at the structural level. For example,
some aspects of the Principles and Rules could be interpreted
as affecting public rather than purely private concerns.420
While problematic elements could be excised from the parties’
agreement, extensive alterations could very well create ambiguities that could result in an unenforceable agreement.

415. Id. at 22–23.
416. Id. at 20–21.
417. See id. at 41–42.
418. See id.
419. See id. at 99–100; GARNETT, supra note 20, at 68–69.
420. A considerable amount of debate could arise as to what aspects of litigation relate only to the relationship between the parties. Some of the more
promising provisions would likely involve the taking and presentation of evidence. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 128–47. Rules relating to the
constituent elements of the statement of claim (complaint) and statement of
defense could be seen as either public or private in nature. See id. at 111–13.
Although settlement offers are typically considered to be a private matter in
the United States (with the exception of settlements of class actions, which
require court approval), the ALI/UNIDROIT rule regarding settlement contains certain public elements. See id. at 117–20; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
Furthermore, provisions requiring a single concentrated hearing could run
afoul of traditions developed in civil law systems, although civil law courts
could consider those practices waivable. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note
10, at 144–46. Rules regarding the rescission and enforcement of a final
judgment could also be seen as affecting issues of institutional design and the
state sovereign prerogative. See id. at 152–55.
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As a result, parties should only adopt the ALI/UNIDROIT
Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure with
caution.421 Courts are more likely to uphold individualized procedural contracts if those agreements do “not do violence to the
interests of society and the judiciary,”422 and it is not yet clear
whether and to what extent the Principles and Rules focus only
on matters of private concern.423
3. Partial Adoption of Another State’s Procedural Rules
Another possibility for parties seeking to customize their litigation procedures involves the partial adoption of another
state’s procedural rules. Wholesale incorporation of a foreign
state’s procedural code would be impossible, since there is no
way a forum court could or would allow foreign law to control
structural matters involving judicial administration or the relationship between the court and the parties.424 Furthermore,
precedent from the world of international commercial arbitration suggests that the parties’ decision to have a dispute heard
in a particular venue should be given some weight, even in the
face of language purporting to adopt foreign procedural law.425
However, a judge may be willing to apply foreign procedural
law to govern certain specific aspects of the relationship between the parties themselves.
Even a limited choice of foreign procedural law would be not
be without controversy, since conflict of laws analyses currently
“limit the scope of party autonomy to the chosen state’s substantive law and exclude its procedural law.”426 However, the
421. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10; GARNETT, supra note 20, at 69.
422. Paulson, supra note 25, at 478.
423. See ALI & UNIDROIT, supra note 10.
424. BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 161.
425. See Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.
48 (Q.B.D.) 50–51 (Eng.). The English court resolved the issue by allowing
foreign procedural law to apply to “internal” aspects of the arbitral proceeding, while “external” matters (i.e., those involving the relationship between
the arbitration and the courts) remained subject to the law of the arbitral
seat. See id. This distinction between internal and external matters would
also make sense in the litigation context, in that internal matters (i.e., those
involving the parties inter se) could be made subject to a procedural contract
while external matters (i.e., those involving judicial administration and the
relationship between the parties and the court) could not.
426. SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW AROUND THE
WORLD: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS *29 (chapter 3.IV.E)
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traditional conflict of law rule has caused numerous problems
over the years, since “the line between substance and procedure is not drawn in the same way in all systems, nor is the
line always clear in each system.”427 Statutes of limitations
have been particularly troublesome for both courts and commentators, although other problems also exist.428
Interestingly, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
provides some support for partial adoption of foreign procedural law.429 For example, the Restatement indicates that “[a]
court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how
litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law
rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case” because “[e]normous burdens are avoided when a court applies its
own rules, rather than the rules of another state, to issues relating to judicial administration, such as the proper form of action, service of process, pleading, rules of discovery, mode of
trial and execution and costs.”430 This approach is adopted, at
least in part, because “the burdens the court spares itself would
have been wasted effort in most instances, because usually the
decision in the case would not be altered by applying the other
state’s rules of judicial administration.”431
Although the initial presumption is in favor of the procedural
law of the forum court, the Restatement recognizes that many
procedural practices “fall into a gray area between issues relating primarily to judicial administration and those concerned

(forthcoming 2014); see also Regulation (EC) No. 593/208 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), art. 1(3), 2008 O.J. ( L 177) 6; ALI &
UNIDROIT, supra note 10.
427. SYMEONIDES, supra note 426, at *29 (chapter 3.IV.E).
428. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmts. a, b
(1971); COLLINS ET AL., supra note 1, ¶¶ 7-002 to 7-058; SYMEONIDES, supra
note 426, at *29–30 (chapter 3.IV.E).
429. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971). While
opponents to private procedural contracts may claim that the Restatement
requires the law of the forum to govern various procedural issues (such as
those involving questions of notice, pleading, etc.), those aspects of the Restatement can be interpreted as indicating that a private procedural contract
relating to those matters should be upheld to the extent permitted by local
law. See id. §§ 123–38.
430. Id. § 122 & cmt. a.
431. Id. However, as noted previously, procedure can sometimes affect the
outcome of a dispute. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
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primarily with the rights and liabilities of the parties.”432 When
determining which law to apply, courts may consider a number
of factors, including
whether the issue is one to which the parties are likely to
have given thought in the course of entering into the transaction. If they probably shaped their actions with reference to
the local law of a certain state, this is a weighty reason for
applying that law rather than the local law of the forum the
plaintiff has chanced to select.433

Other relevant concerns may include public and private interests in making the dispute resolution process less expensive,
less time-consuming, and less unpredictable.434 As indicated in
this Article, private procedural contracts can not only increase
predictability in international commercial litigation,435 they can
also save expenditures by the parties and the court.436 Therefore, private procedural contracts would appear to be consistent
with the Restatement, particularly if the parties specifically
chose to have certain principles of foreign procedural law apply.437
4. Partial Adoption of Arbitral Rules
Finally, some commentators have suggested that parties
seeking to create an individualized procedural contract in litigation could simply adopt various rules of arbitration.438 This is
432. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (1971).
433. Id.
434. See supra notes 48–95 and accompanying text (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s interest in avoiding unpredictability in international commercial transactions).
435. See supra notes 48–95 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 167–85 and accompanying text.
437. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a
(1971).
438. See Noyes, supra note 27, at 642–44. Interestingly, the
ALI/UNIDROIT Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure are in some ways
both more and less detailed than arbitral rules of procedure. See ALI &
UNIDROIT, supra note 10, at 100–56; see BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1753–
55, 1782–85 (discussing general provisions of arbitral rules). The
ALI/UNIDROIT Rules are more detailed in that they cover a wider range of
issues and in a somewhat more comprehensive manner. For example, provisions regarding the taking and presentation of expert and fact evidence are
far more detailed than many arbitral rules discussing the same subject. But
the rules also lack the specificity of arbitral rules concerning, for example, the
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an intriguing notion, particularly given the thesis advanced
here that international commercial arbitration can provide useful insights into the outer boundaries of procedural autonomy
in litigation.439
In many ways, arbitral rules of procedure would provide a
useful starting point for parties, since most rule sets include
detailed yet flexible provisions on various practical matters
such as deadlines for written submissions, the use of fact and
expert witnesses, etc.440 Not only are these rules tailored to the
particular needs of parties in international commercial disputes, they also feature a useful degree of procedural harmonization while complying with mandatory rules of due process
and procedural fairness.441
However, arbitral rules do not provide a perfect fit for parties
seeking to identify model language for procedural contracts.
Not only are arbitral rules generally too long to be reproduced
in their entirety in a transactional document,442 they also include various structural provisions that would be inappropriate
in a litigation context.443 While the offending language could be
omitted so as not to infringe on matters of public concern, parties would need to be careful not to create any ambiguities as a
result.444 Therefore, it appears as if parties should avoid adopting arbitral rules when attempting to create a procedural contract for use in court.

various deadlines relating to the parties’ submissions. See ALI & UNIDROIT,
supra note 10, at 110–15, 139–47; BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1783.
439. See infra notes 264–89 and accompanying text.
440. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1783; LEW ET AL., supra note 32, ¶ 2110.
441. See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 169–70, 1753–55; GAILLARD & SAVAGE,
supra note 229, ¶ 1272; see also supra notes 330–86 and accompanying text.
442. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 38. Any attempt to incorporate
these rules by reference could very well lead to arbitration rather than litigation, since the rules are generally not used to modify court proceedings. See
id.
443. These provisions address the relationship between the arbitration and
the court or between the parties, the tribunal, and/or the arbitral institution.
See BORN, ICA, supra note 3, at 1753–55, 1782–85 (discussing general provisions of arbitral rules); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 32, at 18–19.
444. See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 2, at 38.
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CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion has shown, private procedural
contracts give rise to a number of structural, substantive, and
logistical concerns. However, none of the issues raised in this
Article has suggested that parties are or should be considered
incapable of altering some of the procedural rules used in court
proceedings. To the contrary, it instead appears possible to allow procedural autonomy in some matters while nevertheless
preserving important state interests in the administration of
justice and the relationship between the courts and the parties.
Much of the analysis conducted herein has been very general
in nature. As such, the discussion does not provide specific answers as to whether and to what extent particular procedural
practices are amenable to private contract. However, it is
hoped that the general methodology adopted herein demonstrates how courts, commentators, and counsel can identify the
appropriate limits of procedural autonomy.
This Article has focused primarily on international commercial litigation because those matters typically involve a higher
degree of procedural and substantive unpredictability due to
the disparate backgrounds of the parties. However, many of the
points made here are also applicable to domestic disputes. Indeed, one of the key authorities supporting procedural autonomy in litigation—Delaware Coalition for Open Government v.
Strine—arose in the domestic context.445
There are numerous ways of analyzing private procedural
contracts, and all of them—theoretical, practical, contractual,
and procedural—have merit. However, this Article has taken
the view that the best way to consider these matters is by differentiating between structural concerns, which affect public
questions of institutional design, and substantive concerns,
which focus on questions of individual liberty and procedural
due process. Only by parsing through the underlying public
and private interests can these issues truly be understood.
More work is undoubtedly needed in this area of law. For example, it would be useful to consider how structural analyses
regarding the public and private aspects of litigation would
play out in civil law jurisdictions. Similarly, it would be helpful
to know whether the due process norms established in interna445. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del.
2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
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tional commercial arbitration are consistent with minimum
procedural protections in jurisdictions other than the United
States. Both of these inquiries will help determine how acceptable private procedural contracts would be around the
world and whether such contracts could or would ever replace
international commercial arbitration as a realistic method of
exercising procedural autonomy.
This Article has taken the view that private procedural contracts provide litigants with the means of structuring their
business affairs in an orderly manner while simultaneously respecting issues of institutional design and due process. As a
result, these sorts of agreements serve both public and private
interests. Although courts and commentators still need to flesh
out the precise boundaries of party autonomy on a procedureby-procedure basis, that work should proceed secure in the understanding that the concept of procedural choice of law should
be valued and protected as much as the notion of substantive
choice of law.

